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LABOR LAW-LABOR'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS MAY REST
ON THE HAUNCHES OF A RAT:

29

U.S.c.

§

158(B)(4)(n)(B) AND

THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT RULE

But you and we should say what we really think, and aim only at
what is possible, for we both alike know that into the discussion of
human affairs the question of justice only enters where there is
equal power to enforce it, and that the powerful exact what they
can, and the weak grant what they must. 1
INTRODUCTION

Organized labor is fighting for its collective life. 2 Congres
sional impotence, ossified labor laws, and a National Labor Rela
tions Board that is more interested in protecting corporate interests
than in allowing working Americans an equal footing, have all led
to this current demise. 3 However, recent years have witnessed the
development of organized labor's new and innovative economic
tool to bring attention to a labor dispute or to protest unjust social
conditions. 4 The tactic involves displaying a large rubber rat,
twenty to thirty feet in height, across the street from a secondary
1. Thucydides, The History of Thucydides Book V, in 2 HISTORIANS OF GREECE
207, 296 (T.M. Alexander ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1909). The above quote oc
curred as part of a justice debate between the Athenian Army and the weaker, over
matched island-state of Melos prior to an invasion in which the entire Melian
population was either murdered or enslaved. !d. at 294-305. During negotiations, the
Athenians demanded unconditional surrender to enslavement. Id. at 295. The Melians
responded by appealing to the much vaunted Athenian sense of social and moral jus
tice. Id. The Athenians countered with the aforementioned retort, which articulates a
theory of justice that continues presently. !d. at 296. This Machiavellian doctrine of
justice has proven to be a sad prophecy in the course of human relations, and unfortu
nately remains acutely prevalent to this day-a doctrine that abdicates justice as a
moral right and turns it into something that the powerful grant to the weak if it serves
them. See id. at 294-306; see also STANLEY ROSEN, PLATO'S REPUBLIC: A STUDY 43
(2005).
2. Max Fraser, Beyond the Labor Board, NATION, Jan. 21, 2008, at 6, 6-8; see also
Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Membership in 2007 (Jan. 25, 2008),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm (stating that private sector union mem
bership is down to 7.5%).
3. Fraser, supra note 2, at 6-8.
4. See Alan Feuer, Labor's Huge Rubber Rat, Caught in a Legal Maze, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2005, at Bl; see also Jessica Marquez, Unions' Inflatable Rat an Endan
gered Species, WORKFORCE MGMT., Sept. 9, 2005, http://www.workforce.com!section/
00/article/24/15/94.html.
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employer that is doing business with a company with whom the
union has a labor dispute with.5 The iconography of the rat display
not only allows the unions a powerfully succinct announcement of a
labor dispute-but does so with a viscerally eye-catching symbol
that demands public attention.
For example, imagine that a labor organization has a labor dis
pute with Company A (a company that employs nonunion employ
ees and pays below-scale wages for the industry). Further imagine
that Company A is working for a "neutral" employer, Company B
(e.g., installing an air conditioning unit). The labor organization
will position the rat outside of Company B's place of business to
bring attention to the labor dispute with Company A, and to per
suade the general public not to do business with either Company A
or Company B.6 The rat might have a sign attached, perhaps stat
ing, "Company A is Unfair to Working People because ...." In
addition, the labor organization will also have one or two members
standing in front of the rat with handbills that further articulate the
dispute. The hope is that the rat will draw attention to the handbil
lers, thus allowing more information to be disseminated to the pub
lic.? This makes it difficult for Company A to continue doing
business as usual within the community. Union organizers have
stated that people are more inclined to ask questions about the
campaign when a giant rat is located at the scene. s
The issue that this Note analyzes is whether the peaceful dis
play of an inflatable rubber rat by organized labor at a neutral em
ployer, for the purposes of disseminating information concerning a
labor dispute with a business partner of that employer, is a violation
5. See, e.g., Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. 1251 (2006); Sheet
Metal Workers Int'! Ass'n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal I), 346 N.L.R.B. 199, 200 n.3 (2006),
enforcement denied and remanded, 491 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
6. This example is an amalgamation of two recent cases in which unions have
used the rat in labor disputes. The facts have been altered to bring to light the sole
issue of this Note, which is primarily the use of the rat, not the supplemental activity
that arose in these cases. See generally Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. at
1251; Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 200 n.3. In addition, it should be noted that if the
union displayed the rat at the primary employer's place of business, such conduct would
be legal pursuant to the "area standards" exception. See generally 2 SECTION OF LA.
BOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE
BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1569-81 (Patrick
Hardin et al. eds., 4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW] (discussing
area standards parameters).
7. See Feuer, supra note 4; Marquez, supra note 4.
8. See Feuer, supra note 4; Marquez, supra note 4; see also Laborers' E. Region
Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. at 1261 (stating that union officials testified that the use of the
rat was to articulate a labor dispute or "aid in protesting social issues.").
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of the secondary boycott provision of the National Labor Relations
Act (Act or NLRA) or, conversely, is protected as an exercise of
free speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 9
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)\O has
had two recent opportunities to pass judgment on the lawfulness of
the display,11 On both occasions, the Board found that the unions
were participating in other proscribed conduct, thus allowing the
question of the display to go unanswered. 12 It is worth noting that
in both cases, the NLRB's General Counsel and the Administrative
Law Judges (ALJ) found the display to violate § 158(b)(4).13 Re
cently, the General Counsel was forced to abandon one of those
claims in light of a review by the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit,14 However, because the D.C. Circuit's decision in Sheet
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I; 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2000).
10. The NLRB is the governing administrative agency that rules on cases involv
ing the NLRA, effectively creating labor law in the United States. Ii is made up of a
five-member panel appointed by the President. BRUCE S. FELDACKER, LABOR GUIDE
TO LABOR LAW 9 (4th ed. 2000). However, Board decisions may be appealed to the
circuit court of appeals. The terms of a circuit decision are binding upon the Board only
for that particular case. Because of the lack of uniformity within circuit decisions, the
Board is not obligated to accept these decisions as precedent. THE DEVELOPING LA
BOR LAW, supra note 6, at 2597-98.
11. See Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 200 n.3; Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund,
346 N.L.R.B. at 1253. Recently the D.C. Circuit reviewed the Board's enforcement
order in Sheet Metal I and remanded the case back to the Board for a decision on issues
not addressed. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'I Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB (Sheet Metal II),
491 F.3d 429, 440 (D.C. CiT. 2007).
12. Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 200 n.3; Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 346
N.L.R.B. at 1253.
13. In both of the most recent rat cases, the AUs followed lockstep with the
General Counsel's legal theory that the rat is coercive and a form of "signal picketing,"
which supported the unfair labor practice charge. See Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund,
346 N.L.R.B. at 1265 (AU Davis's ruling that the display is proscriptive because it
"would reasonably be understood by the employees as a signal or request to engage in a
work stoppage" (quoting Teamsters Local 122, 334 N.L.R.B. 1190, 1191 (2001))); see
also Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 206 (holding that the display of the rat violates
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) because of its "coercive" nature, thus interfering with business of the
secondary employer).
14. See General Counsel's Statement of Position to the Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.
at 8, Sheet Metal Workers Int'I Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 346 N.L.R.B. 199 (2006)
[hereinafter Position Statement] (on file with the Western New England Law Review)
(acquiescing that the rat display did not violate the Act in this instance because the
Board must "accept the court's opinion as the law of the case"). While the D.C. Circuit
did not rule specifically on the legality of the rat, it was clear that the General Counsel
interpreted the court's decision (and dicta) as allowing the peaceful display under
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B)-at least within the jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit. ld. As a result,
the General Counsel advised the Board that the display of the rat would be upheld in
the D.C. Circuit. Thus the charges against it should be dismissed. ld. at 9-13. Whether
or not the Board decides to accept this recommendation is yet to be determined at the
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Metal Workers' International Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB is not bind
ing precedent on the Board, and given the divergent opinions
within the General Counsel's office, the issue of whether the dis
play of the rat has First Amendment protections remains unan
swered with regard to Board law. 15
This novel tactic of displaying a rat at a secondary employer's
place of business has been brought in response to a bourgeoning
workforce crisis in this country. Union membership is at an all time
low, and workers (union and nonunion alike) are working longer
hours and increasing their production-but being paid less. 16 As a
result, corporations are enjoying one of the greatest eras of profit
ability in the history of capitalism, given that "wages and salaries
now make up [the] lowest share of [the] nation's gross domestic
product since the government began recording" this informationP
This Note makes three propositions: First, the use of the rat
does not violate the Act. The display of the rat is neither picketing
in the traditional sense of the word, nor is it "signal picketing," a
tactic that secretly communicates to other union members that a
picket line is present, thus instructing employees of the secondary
publishing of this Note. Further, whether the General Counsel will decide to revive its
previous theory concerning the illegality of the rat in another case or more specifically
in another circuit remains to be seen.
15. Compare Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 200 (using expansive language to de
termine what constitutes picketing), and Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney,
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Div. of Advice, Nat'! Labor Relations Bd., to Roberto Chavarry,
Reg'l Dir., Region 13, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. (Feb. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Advice
Memorandum], available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Advice %20Memos/2006/
13-CC-2584.pdf ("[A] rat is a well-known symbol of a labor dispute and is a signal to
third persons that there is an invisible picket line they should not cross."), and Richard
A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(b)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 905, 924 (2005) (dis
cussing that the NLRB's General Counsel believes that the use of the rat is proscribed),
and Tzvi Mackson-Landsberg, Note, Is a Giant Inflatable Rat an Unlawful Secondary
Picket Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act?, 28 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1519, 1521 (2006) (stating that the NLRB's General Counsel has filed charges
against unions that have used the rat), with Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 438-39 (calling
into question the Board's legal reasoning concerning what is constitutes picketing and
coercive behavior); and supra note 14 and accompanying text.
16. See Steven Greenhouse & David Leonhardt, Real Wages Fail to Match a Rise
in Productivity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 14867117
(Westlaw) (noting that current wages do match inflation rates and represent the "lowest
share of G.D.P. on record: 45.3%"); Dan Hurley, Today's Labor Woes Echo Through
U.S. History, CINCINNATI POST, Sept. 1,2006, at C1, available at 2006 WLNR 15376385
(Westlaw); see also Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 2 (stating that private sector
union membership is down to 7.5%).
17. See Greenhouse & Leonhardt, supra note 16.
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employer not to cross.l 8 Second, the rat is an expressive symbol of
speech because it articulates a labor dispute. Thus any suppression
of the display would violate the union's First Amendment rights
secured under the Constitution. 19 Finally, the rat exemplifies a vital
balancing mechanism in a radically disparate situation, and finding
that the rat violates the Act would be contrary to the pursuit of
industrial peace and justice-the cornerstones of American labor
policy.20
Part LA will begin with a brief look at the history and purpose
of the Act. Part LB will examine the secondary boycott provision
of the statute in an attempt to understand the activities that Con
gress intended the Act to prohibit. Thereafter, Parts LC-E will ex
plore the tenuous relationship that exists between the NLRA and
the First Amendment. Part I will start with an examination of the
Supreme Court's understanding of labor picketing in NLRB v. Fruit
& Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits).21 It
will culminate with the Court's articulation of handbilling in Ed
ward 1. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Con
struction Trades Council (DeBartolo /l).22
As part of this exploration, Part I.E will also examine the way
in which the Court's most recent use of the constitutional avoidance
doctrine has only furthered the confusion of understanding how the
First Amendment is applied to organized labor's use of picketing
and the dissemination of information. Concluding the background
portion, Part II will illustrate what symbols are considered to be
speech and why.
Finally, through examining other related symbolic speech
cases, Part lILA will propose that the display should be judged us
18. These are the central themes that the General Counsel and the AUs rely on
in both of the most recent rat cases. See Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B.
at 1264-65; Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 206 (holding the coerciveness of the activity
to be more dispositive than the signal effect); see also supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech ....").
20. See Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can
We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 142 (2003); Richard N. Block et al., An Introduction to
the Current State of Workers' Rights, in JUSTICE ON THE JOB: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
EROSION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 2 (Richard N. Block
et al. eds., 2006).
21. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 59-61 (1964).
22. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
(DeBartolo l/), 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
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ing the strict-scrutiny analysis due to the inherent political nature of
the speech and that any suppression would amount to an improper
restriction of the content of the speech. In conclusion, Parts III.B
D will illustrate, unequivocally, the legality of the display under
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA through case law, statutory con
struction, and policy initiatives under the Act.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT:
LABOR'S STRUGGLE TO KEEP PACE

A.

The History and Purpose of the National Labor Relations Act
of 1935

The NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act, was passed in 1935
amid a national political and economic crisis. 23 In an era of eco
nomic dissolution, upheaval, strife, and violence, Senator Robert
Wagner introduced a bill that attempted to bring justice to the
working people and, consequently, industrial peace to the United
States. 24 Though wildly unpopular with the corporate power struc
ture, Senator Wagner understood that "[d]emocracy cannot work
unless it is honored in the factory as well as the polling booth;
[workers] cannot be truly free in body and in spirit unless their free
dom extends into places where they earn their daily bread."25
While desire for industrial and social peace was the genesis of
such radical legislation, the Act also represented an attempt to in
fuse a semblance of equality into the relationship between the com
mercial power structure and the American worker. 26 Corporate
avarice, substandard wages, and poverty provided fertile ground for
Communist revolutionaries. Therefore, one could speculate that
the passage of the Act was, in some ways, an attempt to "de-com
modify" the labor force, thus offering the American worker some
justice, surplus labor value, and bargaining power against the back
23. WALTER E. OBERER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: COL
LECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY 99 (5th ed. 2002).
24. See generally NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,23 n.2, 34
(1937) (discussing how one purpose of the Act was to promote industrial justice and
"seek to make appropriate collective action of employees an instrument of peace rather
than of strife" (emphasis added)). The Act was largely enacted, in the midst of the
Great Depression, to allow workers the right to collectively organize as a means to
quell not only economic dissolution but also the "mounting strike crisis" in American
labor. HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM TIlE WAGNER ACT TO TAIT
HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 19-29
(1950).
25. Block et aI., supra note 20, at 1 (quoting Senator Robert Wagner).
26. See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316-17 (1965).
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drop of an overwhelmingly powerful corporate policy arrange
menU7 Justice Stewart articulated this point concisely, stating that
the "primary purpose of the [NLRA] was to redress the perceived
imbalance of economic power between labor and management."28
Prior to the Wagner Act, workers possessed no tangible rights
to form unions or collectively bargain,29 While the NLRA has un
dergone numerous changes throughout its history, its basic purpose
remains intact: to restore competitive balance to an area of inherent
disparity and to promote industrial peace and justice. 30
B.

The Curse of § J58(b)(4)(U) (B)

One of the more challenging endeavors for labor law scholars
and practitioners is the interpretation of the secondary boycott pro
vision of the NLRA, codified at 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).31
Much of this difficulty stems from the fact that the Act does not
articulate exactly what a secondary boycott is or the types of union
conduct concerning secondary employers are specifically prohib
ited. 32 Instead, the Act provides tortured and vague language that
attempts to regulate union conduct as it pertains to secondary activ
ity involving a neutral employer. 33
27. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY
71 (1975); HENRY PELLlNG, AMERICAN LABOR 126-27 (1960). See generally KARL
MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (Friedrich En
gels ed., Samuel Moore trans., 1888) (1848), reprinted in THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO
AND OTHER WRITINGS 7, 7-28 (George Stade ed., 2005). At the risk of oversimplifying
Marxist theory, it was posited that the unorganized "incoherent mass" of workers
would eventually rise to revolution, thus breaking the chains of industrialized enslave
ment. However, the codification of the NLRA that allowed workers to collectively
bargain gave workers a state-sanctioned increase value of their surplus labor possibly
not envisioned by Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto. See id.
28. Am. Ship Bldg. Co., 380 U.S. at 316.
29. FELDACKER, supra note 10, at 2-3; OBERER ET AL., supra note 23, at 99-100.
Prior to the NLRA, the Railway Labor Act recognized the right of employees to form
unions and bargain collectively, but only extended those rights to railway and airline
employees. See FELDACKER, supra note 10, at 2-3.
30. Am. Ship Bldg. Co., 380 U.S. at 316; OBERER ET AL., supra note 23, at 99-100.
31. See Bock, supra note 14, at 905-07.
32. Id. at 907-08. Additionally, it should be noted that the proceeding examina
tion in no way is an attempt at comprehensive examination of this section of the statute.
Such an endeavor is the sole subject of numerous scholarly writings. This Note tries to
untangle the matrix of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) only enough to analyze the use of the inflat
able rat as a means of disseminating information to the public at large. Admittedly
there are a multitude of corollaries that one could embark on given this scenario
those are left to other scholars, for a different day.
33. The relevant section of the Act states:
(b) Unfair labor practices by labor organization
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
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In trying to define the contours of a secondary boycott, Judge
Learned Hand's description remains one of the more concise
definitions:
"The gravamen of a secondary boycott ... is that its sanctions
bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute,
but upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its aim is to
compel him to stop [doing] business with the employer in the
hope that this will induce the employer to give in to his employ
ees' demands."34

Applying § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) to union conduct toward a secon
dary employer has not been a simple task for either the NLRB or

(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any
goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof
is
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, han
dling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing busi
ness with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other em
ployer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees unless such labor organization has
been certified as the representative of such employees ... ;
... Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only,
nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit public
ity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public,
including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product
or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organiza
tion has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as
long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual
employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of
his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or
not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged
in such distribution ....
29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4) (2000).
34. Howard Lesnik, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
1363, 1363 (1962) (emphasis added) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of EIec. Workers v. NLRB, 181
F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950». With all due respect to the venerable Judge Hand, this
statement is archaic and misleading. To say that an employer has no concern or respon
sibility in the type of people it hires offers a veil of protection that appear incongruous
with the goal of the NLRA of establishing industrial peace. Should a secondary em
ployer be abrogated of responsibility when its employees are committing illegal or im
moral acts?
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the courtS.35 Stated in its simplest form, § 158(b)(4)(i) prohibits un
ions from "engaging in a strike or other form of work stoppage; and
. . . inducing or encouraging certain individuals to do the same
thing."36 Section 158(b)(4)(ii) makes it unlawful "to threaten, co
erce or restrain any person" in the course of business of the secon
dary employer.J7 However, if the aim of the union conduct is to
"force or require one person to cease doing business with another
person," and that person is a neutral employer, such activity will
usually be held to violate the Act if a neutral employer is
involved. 38
Section 158(b)(4)(ii) was added in 1959 as part of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (also known as the
Landrum-Griffin Act).39 The Landrum-Griffin Act was enacted
primarily to close "loopholes" left open by the previous version of
the statute, which allowed picketing at secondary sites with the tar
get being supervisors and customers. 40 Fundamentally, the Su
preme Court has interpreted the amendments to protect neutral
employers from being dragged into labor disputes that are not of
their own making. 41
35. See DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW 251-52 (2d ed.
2005).
36. See Bock, supra note 14, at 917.
37. 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). Basically, the first section of § 158(b)(4)(i) per
tains to union conduct that appeals to the neutral company's employees, other unions,
workers, delivery people, etc. not to deal with the secondary employer. See also Bock,
supra note 14, at 913-16. For there to be violation of § 158(b)(4)(i), the union conduct
must, in some way, overtly call or signal for a work stoppage by employees of the secon
daryemployer. While § 158(b)(4)(i) primarily concerns appeals to workers associated
with the secondary employer, § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) encompasses everyone else that en
gages in business with the secondary employer. [d.
38. Lee Modjeska, The Tree Fruits Consumer Picketing Case-A Retrospective
Analysis, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1984).
39. [d.; see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 49-50, 58-59.
40. Prior to 1959, prohibited activity only applied to statutorily defined employ
ees and employers. See Bock, supra note 14, at 913. Moreover, the previous
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) did not proscribe any type of activity pertaining to supervisors, man
agement, or the general public. See id. at 917; see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,
supra note 6, at 1627 (discussing Senator Kennedy's comments that the main goal of the
Landrum-Griffin amendments was to close loopholes left open for secondary boycotts
in the Act).
41. See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1008 ("The section embodies 'the dual con
gressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to
bear on offending employers in primary' labor disputes and of shielding unoffending
employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own.'" (quoting NLRB
v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 341 U.S. 675, 692
(1951))).
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In addition to closing the loopholes that allowed unions to
picket, strike, or boycott secondary employers, Congress also at
tempted to preserve organized labor's ability to communicate labor
disputes to the public at large. 42 In doing so, Congress attached a
publicity proviso to try to curb potential constitutional questions
that would inevitably arise as a result of proscribing all activity at a
secondary location. 43
The proviso allows "truthful· handbills and similar forms of
publicity-but not picketing-[to] be employed [by unions] to in
form consumers generally" that products subject to a labor dispute
are being distributed by the secondary employer.44 However, pub
licity allowed under the proviso is subject to several limitations.
These include the requirement that publicity must not '''have an
effect of inducing' an employee, other than an employee of the pri
mary employer, to refuse to perform his or her duties."45 Moreo
ver, the publicity used to articulate a labor dispute cannot be
"threaten[ing], coerc[ive] or restrain[ing]" to "any person" doing
business with the secondary employer. 46
The aforementioned amendments and proviso are the result of
much debate, which may explain why the language and history of
the provision have been subject to such varying interpretations. 47
There are a multitude of circumstances that could potentially chal
lenge the interpretation of "threaten, coerce, or restrain."48 In rela
tion to § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), defining what violates the Act
specifically the idioms "handbill" and "picket"-has been the cause
of much confusion and litigation. 49
In essence, the plain wording of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) protects sec
ondary employers from most types of picketing. This includes in
terfering with employees of the secondary employer and
discouraging consumers with picket lines. 50 As Professor Modjeska
points out, "The clear congressional understanding appears to have
42. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1628.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1629.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. See id. at 1630 (quoting 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii)); see also OBERER ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 403.
47. See Bock, supra note 14, at 907-16 (discussing the various amendments and
provisos added by Congress and the difficulty of defining secondary boycott).
48. 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii).
49. See generally Bock, supra note 14, at 918-24 (discussing the difficulties of la
bor practitioners dealing with § 158(b)(4)(ii) issues).
50. See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1031-32.
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been that the mere existence of a consumer picket line imposed a
threat of business loss that would tend to restrain and coerce the
secondary employer, thereby exerting pressure on the secondary to
cease doing business with the primary employer."51 Because pick
eting has been generally interpreted as being restraining and coer
cive to the secondary employer, consumer picketing at a secondary
employer has been prohibited, with the exception of very limited
circumstances. 52 What constitutes a picket line as well as the consti
tutionality of such a proscription will be explored in the ensuing
sections.53
This is not to say that the union cannot publicly disseminate
issues of a labor dispute with a primary employer at a secondary
site pursuant to § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).54 In the seminal case of Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction
Trades Council (DeBartolo II), the Supreme Court examined a situ
ation in which union members distributed informational handbills
to shopping mall customers that detailed the specifics of a labor
dispute with a company doing construction inside the complex. 55
The secondary employer (the mall) filed an unfair labor practice
petition alleging that the handbilling was proscribed conduct under
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).56 The Court, however, rejected this argument,
and held that peaceful hand billing did not rise to the level of being
coercive, threatening, or restraining under the language of the stat
ute. 57 DeBartolo II held that such a proscription had the potential
to raise serious First Amendment concerns; thus, it chose to avoid
those concerns by assuming that Congress intended not to prohibit
peaceful handbilling at secondary sites. 58 Herein lies the curse of
51. Id. at 1032.
52. There are some types of consumer picketing allowed at secondary sites. The
Court in Tree Fruits allowed consumer picketing constrained only to the struck product
in limited situations. [d. at 1005. This case will be explored in more detail in the subse
quent section. See infra Part I.e.1.
53. See discussion in infra Part I.D.
54. See generally Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council (DeBartolo 11), 485 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1988) (holding that peaceful
handbilling at the mall did not rise to level of picketing).
55. [d. at 570-71. For an in-depth discussion of DeBartolo 11 see infra Part I.E.1.
56. [d. at 571-72.
57. [d. at 578. The Court used the proviso merely as a clarifying agent and not
the foundation, which allowed handbilling. See Bock, supra note 14, at 923.
58. DeBartolo 11, 485 U.S. at 575; see also Overstreet v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2005);
Thomas e. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First
Amendment Discourse and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149, 171
(1990).
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§ 158(b)(4)(ii)-that is, attempting to predict which behavior trips

the "coercive" hatch-door within the statute and, thus, turns speech
into proscriptive conduct.
C.

Tree Fruits to Safeco: The Evolution of Consumer Picketing
and the Tension with the First Amendment
1.

Tree Fruits

In 1964 the Supreme Court was confronted with a consumer
picketing case that, by all accounts, should not have been as re
markable as it turned out to be. 59 In Tree Fruits, the union picketed
a grocery chain that sold the apples of the company with which it
was engaged in a labor dispute. 6o The union distributed handbills,
carried picket signs, and peacefully asked that customers not buy
the struck product. 61 The Board read the statute and the proviso
literally and found "that such picketing always threatens, coerces or
restrains the secondary employer."62 However, in a "virtuoso per
formance," the Court held that § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) "was not in
tended to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary
sites."63 Within the calculus of the majority's decision was Justice
Brennan's "concern" that such an outright "ban against peaceful
59. See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1005-06.
60. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 59-61 (1964). Union officials for Local 760 called a strike against
the Tree Fruits Labor Relations Committee Inc. Id. at 59-60. To call attention to its
labor dispute with the company, the union called for a consumer boycott of the apples
that Tree Fruits was selling. Id. In consequence, the union peacefully picketed and
distributed handbills to consumers at Safeway grocery stores urging customers not to
purchase Tree Fruits apples. Id. at 61.
61. See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1012-13. It should be added that the union
only requested consumers not to buy Tree Fruits apples. Id. at 1012. The picketers
made no attempt to block entrances or intimidate employees of Safeway not to work.
Id. at 1013. In fact, at locations in which stores were located at the end of a parking lot,
the union picketed and hand billed from the public sidewalks to further lessen intimida
tion. Id. at 1013-14; see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1634.
62. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 62. The section of the statute that the Board read
literally was subsection B. Id. at 59 (citing 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B». Section
158(b)(4) states, in pertinent part, that "[n]othing contained in ... paragraph [4] shall
be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization." 29
U.S.c. § 158(b)(4) (emphasis added). Consequently, the Board interpreted the statute
and the legislative history to ban any consumer picketing at secondary sites. Tree
Fruits, 377 U.S. at 61-62.
63. Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1006, 1015; see also Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 72
("[I]t is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."
(quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892))).
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picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First
Amendment. "64
The Court examined the legislative history of the Landrum
Griffin Act and concluded that, despite the language, the congres
sional debates did "not reflect with requisite clarity a congressional
plan to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary
sites."65 What Congress did seek to prohibit was the "isolated evil"
of using the picket line to persuade customers to stop trading with
the secondary employer, thus forcing it to cease doing business with
the primary target. 66 Because the union was only concentrating its
campaign against Tree Fruits Company's apples, and because it was
not asking Safeway customers or employees to completely boycott
the store, the activity did not fall within what Congress sought to
proscribe. 67 Because there was no attempt to shut off all trade with
the secondary employer, the Court "distinguished 'peaceful con
sumer picketing to shut off all trade' ... which creates 'a separate
dispute with the secondary employer,' from picketing that 'only
persuades his customers not to buy the struck product' and is
closely confined to the primary dispute."68 This "unity of interest"
versus the "primary boycott" distinction is the theoretical hinge
that the Court relies upon in creating an exception for consumer
picketing of a struck product. 69
Coupling the statutory language that allows "publicity, other
than picketing" with Senator John F. Kennedy's explanation of the
committee compromise (which appears to follow lock-step with the
statute), leaves one puzzled as to why the Court chose its strained
and attenuated syllogistic pathJo Senator Kennedy clarified that
the purpose of adding the proviso to the statute was to protect
"[T]he right to appeal to consumers by methods other than pick
eting asking them to refrain from buying goods made by nonun
ion labor and to refrain from trading with a retailer who sells
such goods. . .. We were not able to persuade the House confer
ees to permit picketing in front of that secondary shop, but were
able to persuade them to agree that the union shall be free to
64.
65.
66.

67.
68.
note 38,
69.
70.

Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63.
/d.
[d.

See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1014.
supra note 6, at 1634-35; Modjeska, supra
at 1016.
See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1016-17.
29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4) (2000) (emphasis added).
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,
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conduct informational activity short of picketing. In other words
... all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing . ... "71

However, Justice Black's concurrence in Tree Fruits gives in
sight into the motive behind such creative statutory construction. 72
In his opinion, Justice Black agreed with the dissent that the word
ing of the statute is clear in that it "forbid [s] the striking employees
of one business to picket the premises of a neutral business where
the purpose of the picketing is to persuade customers ... not to buy
goods supplied by the struck employer. "73 Justice Black diverged
from this path and aligned with the majority, suggesting that such a
blanket prohibition of consumer picketing would most certainly vi
olate the First Amendment in that it "abridges freedom of speech
and press. "74
Moreover, the concurrence analogized Tree Fruits to Thornhill
v. Alabama, in which the Court struck down a statute that banned
all picketing because "[t]he sweeping and inexact terms of the ordi
nance disclose[ d) the threat to freedom of speech inherent in its
existence."75 While Justice Black acquiesced to the notion that
picketing involves a semblance of conduct,76 he also recognized that
it is infused with constitutionally protected speech.?7 In cases
where regulation of the former will likely impede the latter, "it is
the duty of the courts ... 'to weigh the circumstances and to ap
praise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the
regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights' of speech and
press."78
The concurrence furthers the argument by stating:
Even assuming that the Federal Government has power to bar or
otherwise regulate patrolling by persons on local streets or adja
cent to local business[es] ... it is difficult to see that the section in
question intends to do anything but prevent dissemination of in
71. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 70 (second emphasis added) (quoting 105 CONGo REC.
S16,414 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 2 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
ACT OF 1959, at 1432 (1959) [hereinafter 2 NLRB]).
72. See Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1016-18 (showing the attenuation between
the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions).
73. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 76 (Black, J., concurring).
74. Id.
75. [d. at 77 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940».
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 78 (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939».
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formation about the facts of a labor dispute-a right protected by
the First Amendment. 79

If the picketers advocated unlawful action, or if the government ar

gued that the speech should be minimally regulated, there might
have been more leniency in the analysis from the concurring voice
of the Court. 80
In sum, the Tree Fruits majority understood the serious consti
tutional implications of proscribing all consumer picketing and, de
spite the wording of §158(b)(4)(ii)(B), fashioned a creative path of
least resistance to avoid them. 81 In doing so, the majority and the
concurrence of the Court expressed an awareness of the existing
constitutional pitfalls that lie in wait should the Court enjoin all
consumer picketing at a secondary site.
2.

Sa/eco

Twenty-four years after Tree Fruits, the Court revisited the sec
ondary consumer product-picketing issue in NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union, LocallOOl (Sa/eco). In Sa/eco the union had a
labor dispute with the Safeco Title Insurance Company.82 The
union picketed the local title companies that did business with
Safeco. 83 While the case seemed very similar to Tree Fruits, the
Court distinguished Tree Fruits on the ground that five of the com
panies picketed received over ninety percent of their business from
the sale of Safeco insurance. 84
In a plurality decision, the Court distinguished the allowable
struck product in Tree Fruits from the struck product in Sa/eco
79. [d. (emphasis added); see also Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 102 ("[T]he dissemina
tion of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within
that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.").
80. Justice Black opined in his concurring opinion that there was no other reason
to prevent the picketers other than silencing their message. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 78
79. There were no arguments made that the legislature passed the statute in an attempt
to protect the people from breach of the peace or violence. Rather, the section "is
aimed at outlawing free discussion of one side of a certain kind of labor dispute and
cannot be sustained as a permissible regulation of patrolling." [d. at 79.
81. /d. at 72 (majority opinion); see also Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1016. See
generally OBERER ET AL., supra note 23, at 440-41. The editors pose the question of
whether the Court chose to alter the meaning of the statute in order to circumvent the
more pressing constitutional question.
82. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeeo), 447 U.S. 607,
609 (1980) (plurality opinion).
83. [d. at 609-10.
84. [d. at 609; see also Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law,
23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 57,85-86 (2002).
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where "the struck product constitute[ d] the sole or central product
of the secondary employer."85 Noncoercive consumer picketing
limited to a struck product (as in Tree Fruits), becomes coercive
when picketing the struck product forces the neutral company to
shut off business with the primary employer embroiled in the labor
dispute. 86 Thus, the Court created a new wrinkle in the test for
consumer-product picketing; consumer-product picketing will be
deemed coercive if it "is 'reasonably calculated to induce customers
not to patronize neutral parties at all.' "87 In cases falling between
the factual poles of Tree Fruits and Safeco, the Court instructed
lower courts to examine "whether ... the secondary appeal is rea
sonably likely to threaten the neutral party with ruin or substantial
10ss."88 This type of analysis is aptly referred to as the "merged
product doctrine. "89
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens acknowledged that serious
constitutional issues lurked beneath the surface of this case, stating,
"The constitutional issue, however, is not quite as easy as the plu
rality would make it seem."90 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens found
the restriction constitutional, stating, "Like so many other kinds of
expression, picketing is a mixture of conduct and communication.
In the labor context, it is the conduct element rather than the partic
ular idea being expressed that often provides the most persuasive
deterrent to third persons about to enter a business
establishment."91
Cognizant of the delicate balance between the union's First
Amendment rights and the desire to protect neutrals from coercion,
Justice Stevens focused on the conduct component of the picket,
85. Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1020.
86. The Court held that because this type of action left the neutral employers
with no viable choice "between their survival and the severance of their ties with
Safeco, the picketing plainly violate[ d the] statutory ban on the coercion of neutrals."
Safeco, 447 U.S. at 615; see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1635
36; Fisk, supra note 84, at 85-86; Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1020.
87. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 614 (quoting Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001,
226 N.L.R.B. 754, 757 (1976), rev'd, 447 U.S. 607 (1980». This explanation by no
means attempted to articulate the complexities of deciphering the doctrines associated
with product picketing. It only attempted to illustrate the basic evolution of the Court's
philosophy regarding consumer picketing and the tension posed by the First Amend
ment. For a more detailed articulation on the parameters of product picketing, see THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1634-36.
88. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 615 n.l1.
89. See Bock, supra note 14, at 955.
90. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 618-19 (emphasis added).
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rather than the particular idea being disseminated stating,
'''[p]icketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since
it involves patrol of a particular locality.' "92 Justice Stevens differ
entiated between a customer's response to conduct and the cus
tomer's response to an idea, which presumably would be protected
by the First Amendment. 93 Justice Stevens leaves open the possibil
ity that expression of an idea and, more pertinently, bringing public
attention to that idea (for example, handing out handbills) would
be protected under the First Amendment because the activity in
question "depends entirely on the persuasive force of the idea."94
In sum, Tree Fruits and Safeco illustrate the struggle the Court
faces when trying to define and protect First Amendment rights
within the complex sphere of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).95 Moreover, these
cases reveal a disparity of analysis as a result of the inherent tension
between § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) and the First Amendment. 96
D.

Picketing or Speech: Understanding the Parameters
1.

The Board's View

There are distinct inconsistencies in recent Board opinions re
garding what types of activity constitute picketing. 97 No case artic
92. ld. at 619 (emphasis added) (quoting Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers
Local 802 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
93. In wrestling with the admittedly difficult constitutional question, Justice Ste
vens stated that
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves
patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may
induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the
ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it
the subject of restrictive regulation."
ld. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Wohl, 315 U.S. at 776-77 (Douglas, J., con
curring)); see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at 1719 (acknowledging
the distinction Justice Stevens made pursuant to handbills and picketing).
94. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619.
95. Brian K. Beard, Comment, Secondary Boycotts After DeBartolo: Has the Su
preme Court Handed Unions a Powerful New Weapon?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 217, 221
(1989).
96. Fisk, supra note 84, at 85-86; Kohler, supra note 58, at 178; Modjeska, supra
note 38, at 1016-22; see also Beard, supra note 95, at 221.
97. See Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1253 n.5 (2006); Sheet
Metal Workers Int'I Ass'n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal I), 346 N.L.R.B. 199, 200 (2006)
(Liebman, Member, concurring in part) (implying that picketing requires a physical or
symbolic barrier), enforcement denied and remanded, 491 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
These inconsistencies are further exacerbated by the D.C. Circuit's recent implicit re
versal of the Board's interpretation of picketing in Sheet Metal I. Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'I Ass'n, Local 15 V. NLRB (Sheet Metal II), 491 F.3d. 429, 439-40 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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ulates this tension more succinctly than Sheet Metal Workers Local
15 (Sheet Metal 1).98 At issue were the definitional components
that give rise to the consequential moniker of picketing. 99 In Sheet
Metal I, the union was charged with a violation of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B)
because it staged a "mock funeral" in front of a hospital to bring
attention to a labor dispute with a construction company working
inside the hospital. lOo In addition to the "funeral procession," the
union also handed out handbills and displayed the infamous rubber
rat on public property.1 01 While the Board was unanimous in con
cluding that the mock funeral procession was an unlawful secon
dary activity under § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), there was a divergence in the
legal analysis as to why.1 02
Member Liebman found that the procession was unlawful be
cause the four people were engaged in "ambulatory patrolling,"
thus "effectively creat[ing] a symbolic barrier, a line in front of the
entrance way not to be crossed."103 Relying on the principles ar
ticulated in DeBartolo II, and more recently by the Ninth Circuit in
Overstreet v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 1506, Mem
ber Liebman opined that there needed to be something "more than
mere persuasion" in the delivery of the message-"it also involves
the intimidation of the physical or symbolic barrier to the entrance
way."104
98. Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d 429. The procedural history of Sheet Metal encom
passes three distinct decisions of import. The first is from the Eleventh Circuit regard
ing an injunction, the second from the Board's decision of the unfair labor practice
charge, and lastly the most recent D.C. Circuit denial to enforce the Board's order. See
id. at 438-39.
99. See Sheet Metal I, 346 N.L.R.B. at 200 n.3. While the display of the rat was an
issue in Sheet Metal I, the Board was able pass on the legality given the plethora of
union protests. Id. Rather, the Board focused on other proscribed behavior in at
tempting to define picketing. Id. at 200.
100. Id. at 199. In pertinent part, the union conducted a mock funeral procession
(complete with a faux casket and a person dressed as the grim reaper), passed out leaf
lets, and displayed a large rubber rat on public property. The members actually carried
the casket and patrolled back and forth on the property. Id. at 199-200.
101. Id. at 200 n.3. As previously mentioned, the Board chose not to pass judg
ment on the rat believing that the other conduct violated § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) and that
there was no need to tackle the more difficult question of the rat. Id.
102. The Board found the activity of the funeral procession to be unlawful picket
ing of a secondary employer, which would induce a severance with the primary. Thus
the activity was coercive and a violation of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). Id. at 200.
103. /d. (Liebman, Member, concurring in part) (relying on Overstreet v. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local Union No. 1506,409 F.3d 1199
(9th Cir. 2005)).
104. Id. ("In finding the violation I am guided by the principles set forth in
[DeBartolo II] and [Overstreet]." (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
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The crux of Liebman's reasoning was grounded in the ambula
tory conduct of the participants and appeared in the last sentence of
her in-part concurrence, where she stated:
The gravamen of the violation is not that patrollers carried a faux
casket and a costumed "grim reaper" figure carrying a sickle, for
these expressive displays offer "mere persuasion" and do not
serve to erect a physical or symbolic barrier to the Medical
Center's entrance. Rather, it is the patrolling itself that erected a
barrier to entering the hospital. 10 5

In guarded prose, the majority did not agree with Member
Liebman's analysis of the situation. In particular, the majority dis
agreed with the premise that picketing "requires a physical or sym
bolic barrier."106 In doing so, the majority cast a broad and
noncommittal net in trying to define picketing, stating, "[i]t may be
that other conduct, short of a barrier, can be 'conduct' that is pick
eting or at least 'restraint or coercion' within the meaning of Sec
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). "107
2.

The D.C. Circuit's Rebuke

Subsequent to the Board's decision in Sheet Metal I, the union
petitioned the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for review, and
the Board cross appealed for enforcement of its original order.108
The court disagreed with the Board's conclusion that the conduct of
the union was the "functional equivalent of picketing" and denied
enforcement of the order, which essentially reversed the Board's
decision. 109 The court analogized the conduct of the mock funeral
to hand billing, finding that the means employed merely produced a
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Overstreet,
409 F.3d 1199)).
105. ld.
106. ld. (majority opinion).
107. ld.; see also Timothy F. Ryan & Katherine M. Davis, Banners, Rats, and
Other Inflatable Toys: Do They Constitute Picket Activity? Do They Violate Section
8(b)(4)?, 20 LAB. LAW. 137, 154 (2004) (positing that the "visceral" message is enough
to "dissuad[e] ... consumer[s] from dealing with neutral employer. As a result, this
conduct is clearly most analogous with 'picketing' ").
108. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB (Sheet Metal II), 491
F.3d 429, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
109. ld. at 438-40. It is important to note that while the Board is obligated to
follow the order of the court of appeals in this case, it does not become precedent perti
nent to Board law. In other words, the Board is not obligated to adopt the D.C. Cir
cuit's interpretation of picketing in a subsequent case. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supra note 6, at 2597-98.
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persuaSIve message not to patronize the hospital and nothing
more. 110
The D.C. Circuit held the conduct to be "a combination of
street theater and hand billing" and, thus, completely legal under
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) and the Supreme Court's holding in DeBartolo
II.III The court went on to rebuke any notions that the conduct
rose to the level of "signal picketing" or that it "interfered with or
confronted patrons entering or leaving the hospital. "112
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit delineated its holding from Mem
ber Liebman's concurrence, opining that the presence of ambula
tory patrol does not automatically create a symbolic barrier that is
the functional equivalent of picketing. I 13 In this instance there was
no interference, no interruption, and no overt confrontation with
patrons. The mock funeral occurred parallel to the front of the hos
pital, 100 feet from the entrance.1 14 The court held that to pro
scribe this conduct as picketing simply because of the ambulatory
patrol of the protesters was irreconcilable with its interpretation of
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), or the Supreme Court's definition of picketing in
DeBartolo II.ll5 In essence, the court held that the potential effects
of the activity are more dispositive than the actual conduct itself. In
other words, an ambulatory patrol 100 feet from the entrance of the
hospital does not automatically create a symbolic barrier worthy of
a picket line. 116
Finally, the court dispatched with a contrary ruling by the Elev
enth Circuit that is-at least on first appearance-in direct opposi
tion with the Sheet Metal II decision. 117 Prior to the case being
110. Sheet Metal Jl, 491 F.3d at 438-40.
111. Id. at 437.
112. Id. at 438. The court went on to examine whether the conduct was coercive,
threatening, or intimidating which would also trigger a § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) violation. Un
derstanding the consequential First Amendment implications of such a holding, the
court analogized to recent abortion clinic protests, and found the conduct to be legal
and secondary to First Amendment principles. Id. at 438-40. This concept will be ex
plored in subsequent sections. See infra Part I.E.3.
113. Sheet Metal Jl, 491 F.3d at 438-40.
114. Id. at 432.
115. Id. at 438.
116. !d. The court did not hold that the conduct could never be picketing, but did
bring attention to the fact that in these particular set of facts, there was no interference
or confrontation with patrons of the hospital. Therefore, the court could not accept
Member Liebman's per se rule concerning ambulatory patrol as it related to picketing.
Id.
117. The Eleventh Circuit held that it was reasonable to construe that the mock
funeral was the functional equivalent of picketing. Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l Ass'n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2005).

2008]29

u.s.c. § J58(b)(4)(ii)(B) AND THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT RULE

887

heard by the Board or the D.C. Circuit, a Florida district court
granted the Regional Director of the NLRB an injunction, prohibit
ing the aforementioned conduct because it was the "functional
equivalent of picketing." The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed that decision. 11s The D.C. Circuit criticized the
Board and the Eleventh Circuit for not distinguishing the "ends
from the means" and further stated that the conduct "was not the
functional equivalent of picketing as a means of persuasion because
it had none of the coercive characteristics of picketing, as the Elev
enth Circuit itself found."119 In sum, the answer to this question
appears embedded within the dialectic of these two legal analyses.
3.

Picketing Under the NLRA-Who's Right?

Before embarking on the daunting task of statutory interpreta
tion, it is worth reiterating that the definition of picketing appears
nowhere within the NLRA.12° Merriam Webster's Dictionary de
fines picket in pertinent part as "to walk or stand in front of ... a
person posted by a labor organization at a place of work affected by
a strike, also: a person posted for demonstration or protest."121
Clearly this definition does little to aid in untangling the legal dis
position of this important term of art.
From a historical perspective, the term "picket" is derived
from military origins. "The function of 'pickets' in the military
sense was to prevent, by force or alarm, the crossing by the enemy
of the so-called 'picket line."'122 In contrast however, "[p]olitical
'picketing' does not usually have this military function of prevent
ing the crossing of a line; its purpose is more clearly that of publiciz
ing and dramatizing a point of view and of attracting new adherents
to it. "123
118. Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 437 (quoting Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1265). In fair
ness to the Eleventh Circuit, the standard in a § 10(1) hearing is that the judge must
have a reasonable basis to determine that the injunction is warranted (a significantly
lesser standard than in the present scenario). However, the court's dictum was firmly
entrenched in the aforementioned statement. [d.; see also 29 U.S.c. § 1510(1) (2000).
119. Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 437-38. The court furthered the argument by
rejecting the assertion that the conduct was coercive and thus illegal under
§ 158(b)(4)(ii) of the Act. [d. at 439. This concept will be explored in detail in subse
quent sections. See infra Part I.E.1-.3.
120. RAY ET AL., supra note 35, at 137.
121. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DlcrIONARY 937 (11th ed. 2003).
122. OBERER ET AL., supra note 23, at 359.
123. [d.
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In DeBartolo II, the Supreme Court gave insight into what
types of conduct would classify as picketing in regard to a sec
ondary employer.124 Realizing that a broad definition of picket
or coercion related to a secondary employer would put
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) in a perilous position by exposing it to potential
constitutional violations, the Supreme Court reverted to the legisla
tive history and prior decisions to escape the looming and conse
quential First Amendment trap.125
Returning to its decision in Safeco, the DeBartolo II Court re
iterated that "picketing is 'a mixture of conduct and communica
tion' and the conduct element 'often provides the most persuasive
deterrent.' "126 The Court once again identified picketing as being
significantly different than other forms of communication, and fur
ther distinguished disseminating a message (such as handbilling or
protesting) from picketing because it "depend[s] entirely on the
persuasive force of the idea. "127
In analyzing the statute, the Court interpreted the publicity
proviso to clarify what Congress meant to regulate in pertinence
with § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).128 In due course, the Court relied heavily
on the legislative history of the proviso and the perceived intention
124. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 577-79 (1988). Other courts have examined
DeBartolo II. See Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local
Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1213-16 (9th Cir. 2005); Benson v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Locals 184 & 1498, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1277-80 (D.
Utah 2004); Kohn v. Sw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1165-68
(C.D. Cal. 2003); Sheet Metal Workers Int'I Ass'n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal I), 346
N.L.R.B. 199, 200 (2006) (Liebman, Member, concurring in part), enforcement denied
and remanded, 491 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
125. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578.
The case turns on whether handbilling such as involved here must be held
to "threaten, coerce, or restrain any person" to cease doing business with an
other.... But more than mere persuasion is necessary to prove a violation of
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B): that section requires a showing of threats, coercion, or re
straints. Those words, we have said, are "nonspecific, indeed vague," and
should be interpreted with "caution" and not be given a "broad sweep."
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960)).
126. Id. at 580.
127. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco),
447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
128. The Court relied on Senator Kennedy's post-conference committee com
ments. In describing the compromise agreed upon by Congress, Senator Kennedy
stated that a "union can hand out handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in
newspapers, can make announcements over the radio, and can carryon all publicity
short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site." DeBartolo II, 485
U.S. at 586-87 (quoting 105 CONGo REC. S16,414 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 71, at 1432).
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that Congress sought to allow "all publicity short of ambulatory
picketing in front of a secondary site."129
The NLRB, however, has offered various definitions of picket
ing that appear, at first glance, to be more representative of the
facts of each situation, rather than a concrete principle of law. 130
For example, the Board has found picketing when a large number
of people, gathered without picket signs, were marching in front of
the business handing out handbills. l3l While the Board did not la
bel the conduct as picketing per se, it nevertheless was found to be
coercive in that patrons needed to "force" their way through the
throng to get inside.132
Recently, however, the Board and the Eleventh Circuit have
relied on a broad definition of picketing that was formulated by the
Board in United Mine Workers of America, District 2 (Jeddo Coal
Co.). This definition stated that "[n ]either patrolling alone nor pa
trolling combined with the carrying of placards are essential ele
ments to a finding of picketing; rather, the essential feature of
picketing is the posting of individuals at entrances to a place of

129. Id. at 587.
130. Compare Chi. Typographical Union No. 16, 151 N.L.R.B. 1666, 1669 (1965)
("One of the necessary conditions of 'picketing' is a confrontation in some form be
tween union members and employees, customers, or suppliers who are trying to enter
the employer's premises." (quoting NLRB v. United Furniture Workers of Am., 337
F.2d 936, 940 (2d Cir. 1964))), and Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 (Sheet
Metal 1), 346 N.L.R.B. 199,200 (2006) (Liebman, Member, concurring in part) ("[I]t is
the patrolling itself that erected a barrier ..."), with United Mine Workers of Am.,
Dist. 2 (Jeddo Coal Co.), 334 N.L.R.B. 677, 686, (2001) ("[N]either patrolling alone nor
patrolling combined with the carrying of placards are essential elements to a finding of
picketing; rather, the essential feature of picketing is the posting of individuals at en
trances to a place of work.").
131. Servo Employees Union, Local 87 (Trinity Maintenance), 312 N.L.R.B. 715,
742-43 (1993).
132. [d. at 743. Groups, varying in size from twenty to seventy persons and com
prised of members of a labor organization, who were not carrying placards but who
were distributing handbills, marched in an elliptical path immediately in front of the
main entrance to an exhibition hall and caused patrons to force their way through in
order to enter the building. The Board, while abstaining from labeling the conduct,
concluded that it was coercive conduct within the meaning of § 158(b)(4)(ii). Id. at 742.

890

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:867

work."133 This posting, presumably, is the violative "coercing"
agent which triggers § 158(b)(4)(ii).134
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit rejected this broad defini
tion in a case involving union members holding a large banner in
front of a secondary employer.135 The court in Overstreet stated
that the Board was "not entitled to the usual deference accorded
the agency, because the statutory question must be answered with
the awareness of the line between constitutionally-protected speech
and unprotected activity."136 The Overstreet court concluded that
the mere presence of the union members did not rise to the level of
coerciveness.B7 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit gave the distinct im
pression that ambulatory picketing is necessary to trip the prover
bial trap in secondary pressure cases in which union speech rights
are at issue.138
An added wrinkle to the determination of what constitutes
picketing is the concept of "signal picketing." A typical example of
signal picketing occurs when a union stations members or "placards
near an entrance-positioned so that anyone approaching can read
the printed message."139 This "signal" is construed as conduct that
"induce[s] action by those to whom the signal is given. "140
133. Jeddo Coal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. at 686; see Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'I Ass'n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that, absent placards,
the union's activity of carrying a casket sufficed as picketing). Moreover, the Kentov
court stated:
"The important feature of picketing appears to be the posting by a labor or
ganization ... of individuals at the approach to a place of business to accom
plish a purpose which advances the cause of the union, such as keeping
employees away from work or keeping customers away from the employer's
business."
Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1265 (quoting Lumber & Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2797,
156 N.L.R.B. 388, 394 (1965».
134. Jeddo Coal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. at 686.
135. Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No.
1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005).
136. Id. Traditionally, the courts give broad deference to the Board's interpreta
tion of the NLRA. However, in matters in which a constitutional issue arises, the level
of deference is lessened. Id.
137. Id. at 1215.
138. Id.
139. Servo Employees Union, Local 87 (Trinity Maintenance), 312 N.L.R.B. 715,
743 (1993).
140. Id.; see also Int'I Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers,
Local No. 433 V. NLRB, 598 F.2d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB V. Local 182, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 314 F.2d 53, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that picket signs in snow
banks constituted a picket line); Teamsters, Local Union No. 688 (Levitz Furniture Co.
of Mo., Inc.), 205 N.L.R.B. 1131, 1133 (1973).
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However, the parameters of signal picketing are much nar
rower than those of traditional picketing. 141 Signal picketing also
occurs when union members covertly send messages to other union
members or affiliates and employees of the secondary employer to
"engage in an unfair labor practice."142 The Supreme Court has
stated that free speech protections are not applicable because the
members are sending a signal to other union members that involves
"more than mere speech" of which a failure to abide by the signal is
"implicitly backed up by sanctions. "143
The Overstreet court declined to expand this definition to in
clude anyone coming in contact with the signal. To do so, opined
the court, would be inconsistent with DeBartolo II in that handbil
ling would be classified under the umbrella of signaling, presumably
. raising constitutional issues.l 44 Moreover, using signals tradition
ally associated with a labor dispute does not rise to the artful level
of signal picketing. 145 Words such as "scab" and "rat" have "be
come 'common parlance in labor disputes,''' and thus have no sig
nificance when directed at the general public at large.l 46 This seems
especially true when suppression of the supposed signal would in
cite constitutional issues. 147
In sum, to violate § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), there must be more than
speech and more than the communication of an idea. There must
be some conduct that rises to the level of coerciveness. 148 To what
Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1215.
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675,
690 (1951»; see also Local 274, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumb
ing & Pipefitting Indus., 267 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1114 (1983).
143. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1215 ("The entire concept of signal picketing thus
141.
142.

depends on union employees talking to each other, not the public." (emphasis omit
ted»; see also BRUCE S. FELDACKER, LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAW 305-06 (4th ed.
2000).
144. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1215. This begs the question: Is signal picketing in
and unto itself is constitutional? That question, however, is left for different scholars,
for a different day.
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283
(1974»; see also Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2005) ("The rat has

long been used as a symbol of efforts to protest unfair labor practices ....").
147. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun
cil (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("Another rule of statutory construction,
however, is pertinent here: where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."
(citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979))).
148. Id. at 578. See generally NLRB v. Retail Store Employees (Safeco), 447 U.S.
607 (1980); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree
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end such conduct satisfies the parameters of the statute will be ex
plored further in the ensuing section.
E.

Labor's Unique Brand of Speech: DeBartolo II and Its
Progeny
1.

DeBartolo II & Handbilling

In DeBartolo II, the Court once again revisited the tension be
tween a union's First Amendment right to call public attention to a
labor dispute and neutral party rights in the midst of a labor dis
pute. 149 The union in DeBartolo II had a primary labor dispute
with a subcontractor working within the shopping mall, which the
DeBartolo Corporation (DeBartolo) owned and operated. 150
Rather than picket the mall, the union peacefully distributed
handbills to customers, asking them not to shop at the mall until its
owners promised to pay fair wages and benefits to the construction
workers.l 51 DeBartolo filed an unfair labor practice charge against
the union pursuant to § 158(b)(4)(ii), alleging that the union's activ
ity coerced its customers to shut off all trade with the mall, effec
tively forcing DeBartolo to cease its business with the construction
company.152
The Board ultimately found the activity to be coercive under
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), choosing not to inquire into the constitutional
implications of proscribing the union from handbilling. 153 The
Eleventh Circuit denied enforcement, holding that the Board's de
cision raised constitutional doubts pertinent to the union's First
Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 71 (1964); Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 15, 418
F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2005); Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2005);
Benson v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Locals 184 & 1498, 337 F.
Supp. 2d 1275, 1277 (D. Utah 2004); Kohn v. Sw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 289 F.
Supp. 2d 1155, 1165-67 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Sheet Metal Workers Int'I Ass'n, Local 15
(Sheet Metal I), 346 N.L.R.B. 199, 200 (2006).
149. See generally DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578.
150. Id. at 570.
151. Id. The Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades Council (the
union) had a labor dispute with H.J. High Construction (High) (a subcontractor hired
by H.J. Wilson, the primary contractor). Id. The handbills asked customers not to shop
at the mall because High paid substandard wages. This practice was a community con
cern because it decreased economic purchasing power for working people. ld. at 571.
The handbill specified that it was not "seeking to induce any persons from ceasing work
or making deliveries." ld. at 570 n.1.
152. Id. at 571-72.
153. ld.; see also Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 273 N.L.R.B.
1431, 1432 (1985), affd, 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
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Amendment rights, and it construed the statute not to prohibit con
sumer publicity.154
The Supreme Court also rejected the Board's interpretation of
the statute, holding, as it did in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi
cago, that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress."155 Therefore, in its most basic
form, '" [t]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction
must be resorted to, In order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality.' "156
The Court concluded that the handbills were lawful from sev
eral legal angles. First, they truthfully informed the public of a la
bor dispute. 157 Second, there was no "picketing or patrolling."158
Finally, the speech in question was given a higher value than com
mercial speech because it "pressed the benefits of unionism to the
community and the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy
and the standard of living of the populace."159 The Court contin
ued, stating that such "speech itself is protected by the First
Amendment, however these handbills are to be classified. "160 The
Court concluded that proscription of handbilling would raise seri
ous constitutional issues and, therefore, construed the statute so
that it did not violate the First Amendment. 161
Further, the Court rejected the Board's argument that the
handbills were equally as coercive as a picket line because they in
flicted economic harm onto the mall owners.162 The Court ex
amined the legislative history of the pUblicity proviso of
154. DeBartolo ll, 485 U.S. at 573-74 (citing Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328, 1328 (11th Cir. 1986), affd, 485 U.S. 568
(1988».
155. [d. at 575 (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979».
The obvious constitutional issue in DeBartolo II was that to proscribe citizens' ability to
pass out handbills (secondary to a violation of § 158(b)(4)(ii» could interfere with their
First Amendment speech rights. [d.
156. [d. (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895».
157. [d.
158. [d. at 575-76.
159. !d. at 576.
160. [d. In its summation, the Court appeared to be wrestling with how to clas
sify the speech stating, "[w]e do not suggest that communications by labor unions are
never of the commercial speech variety and thereby entitled to a lesser degree of consti
tutional protection. The handbills involved here, however, do not appear to be typical
commercial speech such as advertising the price of a product." [d.
161. [d. at 578.
162. [d.
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§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) and found it to be a clarifying tool pertinent to

what activity would be tolerated under the statute. 163 The proviso
articulates a clear intent from Congress to allow publicity and
"[h]ad they wanted to bar any and all non-picketing appeals,
through newspapers, radio, television, handbills, or otherwise, the
debates and discussions would surely have reflected this inten
tion."l64 In addition to Senator Kennedy's post-committee state
ments,165 Congressman Griffin stated that "the bill covered
boycotts carried out by picketing neutrals but would not interfere
with the constitutional right of free speech."166 Ignoring the argua
ble non sequitur of this statement, Congressman Griffin nonethe
less claimed that activity short of ambulatory picketing will not be
deemed coercive pursuant to § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) despite the eco
nomic consequences of the speech.167
In short, DeBartolo II interprets the statute to prohibit only
"ambulatory picketing" in regard to labor disputes with secondary
businesses, thus allowing the persuasive force of the union's
handbilling activity even if the activity results in adverse economic
consequences to a neutral party.168 As such, the Court returned to
its earlier rationale in Tree Fruits and Safeco,169 interpreting the
"restrain or coerce" clause of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) to apply only to
narrow circumstances that would not implicate First Amendment
concerns. 170
2.

Overstreet and San Antonio

Recently unions have accentuated their hand billing, not only
with large rubber rats, but also with large handheld banners that
publicize a labor dispute at a secondary site. 171 This activity has
163. Id. at 582.
164. Id. at 584.
165. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (Sen. Kennedy's committee
comments).
166. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 584 (citing 105 CONGo REC. H14,339 (daily ed. Aug.
12, 1959) (statement of Rep. Griffin), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 71, at 1615).
167. Id. at 584-88.
168. Id.; see also Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Lo
cal Union No. 1506,409 F.3d 1199, 1210-12 (9th Cir. 2005).
169. See supra, notes 59-96 and accompanying text.
170. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 584-87
171. See Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1202; San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist.
Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1997); Benson v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Locals 184 & 1498, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1276 (D. Utah
2004); Kohn v. Sw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159-60 (C.D.
Cal. 2003).
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been met with a somewhat mixed analysis by the Board and the
courtS.172 The General Counsel of the NLRB and various AU de
cisions have interpreted the banners to be coercive under the Act
for a variety of reasons.173
In contrast to recent ALJ decisions, the courts have generally
upheld hand-held banners as a valid, legal, and constitutionally pro
tected form of labor speech, even when displayed at a secondary
siteP4 In Overstreet, for example, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that because the banners were "stationary, non
interactive and truthful" and, "[i]n light of the First Amendment
concerns[,] ... Overstreet did not show a fair chance of proving that
the Carpenters' bannering [was] within the scope of the 'threaten,
coerce, or restrain' language of § 158(b)(4)(ii)."175
Following Sa/eco and DeBartoLo II, the Ninth Circuit distin
guished the stationary handheld banners from illegal picketing, stat
ing that, "The physical conduct of picketing 'involves patroL of a
particular locality' and the mere 'presence of a picket line' induces
certain actions-namely refusing to cross that line."176 For all prac
tical purposes, the presence of banners lacked any critical conduct
that would have prohibited them under the statuteP7 Moreover,
the court analogized the banners to the DeBartoLo handbills as be
ing "mere persuasion" and not the same type of intimidation a cus
172. Compare Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1211-12 (holding that banners being held by
union members were more akin to the" 'mere persuasion'" of handbilling of DeBartolo
II than '''intimidation of by a line of picketers' in Safeco" (quoting DeBartolo II, 485
U.S. at 580), with Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'I Ass'n Local 15,418 F.3d 1259,
1265 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[I]t is well-settled that the existence of placards on sticks is not a
prerequisite to a finding that a union engaged in picketing."). While not ruling specifi
cally on the inflatable rat, the Eleventh Circuit, in dicta, referred favorably to the AU's
decision that found the rat to violate § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). Id. at 1266.
173. See Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1203-04 n.7. Currently, all cases regarding "ban
nering" and the "rat" must be submitted to the Division of Advice with a detailed
factual analysis of the case before any charge can be filed. See, e.g., Advice Memoran
dum, supra note 14; see also Kate L. Rakoczy, Comment, On Mock Funerals, Banners,
and Giant Rat Balloons: Why Current Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Na
tional Labor Relations Act Unconstitutionally Burdens Union Speech, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 1621, 1625 n.27 (2007) (stating that there are currently nine bannering cases pend
ing before the Board).
174. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1204 n.7, 1218; Benson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1281;
Kohn, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.
175. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1218-19 (emphasis added).
176. /d. at 1210 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees (Saleco), 447 U.S.
607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring».
177. [d. at 1211-12.
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tomer would experience from an ambulatory picket line producing
a physical or symbolic barrier to the entrance. 178
While choosing to employ the doctrine of constitutional avoid
ance of Catholic Bishop (thUS not ruling specifically whether the
banners are pure speech),179 the Overstreet court held that proscrip
tion of the banners would raise serious constitutional issues. There
fore, it interpreted the statute to allow them absent any clear
prohibition. 180 In dicta, however, the court analogized the banners
to other protected forms of speech such as billboards and signage
and commented that the "pithiness [of the message] does not re
move the banners from the scope of the First Amendment protec
tions. "181 The court maintained that the speech was fully protected
because it intended to convey a message of a social importance. 182
The court rejected the argument that an emotional response to the
banners removed the speech from the protective umbrella of the
First Amendment. It found emotive impact of the words "Shame
on Precision" on the banner in Overstreet to be comparably akin to
that of the "Fuck the Draft" jacket protected in the seminal free
speech case Cohen v. California. As a result, the court found the
banners to be protected speech as wel1. 183
As mentioned previously, the Overstreet court also rejected the
"signal picketing" argument because the banners were not directed
specifically at other union members instructing them that a picket
line was in existence.1 84 Moreover, nonlabor cases have illustrated
that the Court is reluctant to censor legitimate speech because of
the off chance that an improper audience will hear the speech. 185
178.
179.

Id.
Id. at 1214 n.18. Traditionally, the courts give broad deference to the

Board's interpretation of the NLRA. However, in matters in which a constitutional
issue arises, the level of deference decreases. Id.
180. Id. at 1209-11.
181. Id.; see also Thcker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the display of an inflatable rubber rat is protected as symbolic speech).
This case is distinguishable because it concerns a city ordinance, not a secondary boy
cott. Nonetheless, it articulates an important point of speech protection. The court
refers to the "rat" as a symbol of "unfair labor practices." Id.
182. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1212-13; see also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
104 (1940).
183. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1212. In Cohen, the Court stated that "words are
often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force." Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
184. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1215-16.
185. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975) (holding that
drive-in movies that showed naked bodies could not be censored on the grounds that
minors might see them while driving by because such censorship unnecessarily abridged
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The bannering cases further illustrate the dichotomy between
what constitutes picketing and what constitutes coercive behavior
under § 158(b)(4)(ii).l86 It is well settled that fraudulent speech
does not receive First Amendment protection. l87 In San Antonio
Community Hospital v. Southern California District Council of
Carpenters, the court held that hand-held banners stating "THIS
MEDICAL FACILITY IS FULL OF RATS"188 were unlawful be
cause they misled patrons into believing that the hospital had a ro
dent problem. l89
The union argued that the term "rat" has a long history in
describing labor disputes involving an "employer who fails to pay
prevailing wages or a worker who works for substandard wages."190
Therefore, the union argued that the statement was in essence cor
rect in that the facility was full of rats. 191 Predictably, the court
rejected this argument.192 The context in which the union
presented the message was misleading, despite the iconic history of
the rat.l 93 Constitutional protection would be easily reestablished
with some creative and non-misleading wording. For instance, the
court stated that handbills 194 or banners that specifically referred to
the employer as the rat would not be misconstrued as fact.1 95
the First Amendment rights of those who were legally able to encounter the speech);
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
186. See Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1213-15; Benson v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners of Am. Locals 184 & 1498, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (D. Utah 2004); Kohn v. Sw.
Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2003). In all these
cases the General Counsel, Regional Directors, and the AU decisions held that the
banners constituted coercive behavior and, thus, violated the statute. See Rakosczy,
supra note 173, at 1624-25 (pointing out the disparate applications of the "picketing
test").
187. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see also Ryan
& Davis, supra note 107, at 147-48.
188. San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d
1230, 1236 (9th Cir. 1997).
189. Id. at 1236-37. The court held that the hospital had a reasonable chance of
meeting the "actual malice" standard that was articulated in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. Id. at 1240 (citing New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80).
190. San Antonio Cmty. Hasp., 125 F.3d at 1236.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1236-37.
193. Id.; see also Thcker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 2005)
(stating that the "rat" is a symbol "to protest unfair labor practices").
194. Signs that stated, "Don't Help Feed The Rat" that connected the employer
as being the "rat" were permissible. Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, Local 655, 840 F. Supp. 697, 705 (E.D. Mo. 1993), atfd, 39
F.3d 191 (8th Cir. 1994).
195. San Antonio Cmty. Hasp., 125 F.3d at 1236.
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3. The Sheet Metal Split (Redux)
a.

The Eleventh Circuit

The Eleventh Circuit also explored, albeit cursorily, the tenu
ous relationship between a union's First Amendment Rights and
the secondary boycott provision of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).196 Similar to
the Board's eventual opinion, the Eleventh Circuit used an ex
panded lens to define picketing, thus proscribing the union's activi
ties. 197 As mentioned previously, the union in Sheet Metal
conducted a mock funeral procession in front of the Brandon Re
gional Medical Center (the hospital) because of its dispute with an
installation contractor and a staffing company working for the hos
pital. 198 The union distributed handbills to people entering and ex
iting the hospital that read "Going to Brandon Regional Hospital
Should Not be a Grave Decision."199 The "procession" was a wor
thy performance complete with a faux casket, grim reaper, and pall
bearers along a public sidewalk approximately 100 feet from the
hospital's entrance. 200
Such a performance, however, does not immediately violate
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), which consists of two elements. First, there must
be "conduct that threatens, coerces, or restrains." Second, "the
union's conduct [must] force or require an employer or person not
to handle the products of, or to do business with, another per
son. "201 Here, the court held that the procession was equivalent to
picketing and was coercive, thus any First Amendment protection
was removed. 202 In addition to the patrolling element of the con
duct, the court also stated that because the union played loud and
somber music from speakers onsite, the activity was a "'mixture of
conduct and communication' intended to 'provide the most persua
sive deterrent to third persons about to enter. "'203
As Professor Bock points out, the court also positively refer
ences the ALl's decision in its dicta, opining that the "use of an
inflatable rat at a hospital, in tandem with the misleading nature of
196. Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1264-66
(11th Cir. 2005).
197. Id. at 1265-66.
198. Id. at 126l.
199. /d.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1262.
202. Id. at 1266.
203. Id. at 1265 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council (DeBartolo 1/),485 U.S. 568, 582 (1988)).
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handbills distributed at that site, constituted picketing. "204 The
court in Kentov (similar to the Board) was able to sidestep the issue
of the inflatable rat. However, if it were pressed, the court appears
likely to enjoin the activity.205
b.

The D.C. Circuit

After the Eleventh Circuit reviewed and affirmed the prelimi
nary injunction, the Board ruled that the activity was coercive and
appealed to the D.C. Circuit for enforcement of its order. 206 The
D.C. Circuit denied the enforcement of the order and roundly dis
agreed with the Board and the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation
that the funeral procession was "coercive" and, therefore, illegal
under the Act. 207
Recognizing the inherent constitutional implications of such a
decision, the court analogized the mock funeral procession to abor
tion clinic protests. 208 Therefore, any interpretation of the "coer
cive" clause in § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) must be examined through the
lens of First Amendment jurisprudence, not an antiquated interpre
tation used exclusively for labor speech.209 The dispositive question
for the D.C. Circuit was how the Supreme Court could find consti
tutional abortion protests, set up 100 feet from clinics with bul
lhorns and potentially offensive posters, while proscribing the mock
funeral procession. 210 Moreover, just because the funeral proces
sion appeared distasteful or offensive to patrons did not remove its
protection under the First Amendment. 211 Therefore, the court
held that the union's "protest was consistent with the limitations
upheld as constitutional-the buffer zones and the ban on con
frontational conduct-in Madsen and Hill."212
204. See Bock, supra note 14, at 924 n.103.
205. Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1266 n.9; Bock, supra note 14, at 924 n.103.
206. See Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB, (Sheet Metal 11),
491 F.3d. 429, 433-34 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
207. Id. at 439.
208. Id. at 438-39; see also Cannon v. City & County of Denver, 998 F.2d 867,
873-74 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding First Amendment speech rights of abortion clinic
protesters who carried signs which read "The Killing Place").
209. See Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 438-39.
210. See id. at 439 (citing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,758
(1994».
211. Id. (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000».
212. Id. While the D.C. Circuit did not rule on the rat display, it did remand the
case back to "the Board to consider the issues it did not reach"-namely the rat display.
[d. at 440.
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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION

Why Certain Symbols Are Speech

Imbedded within the genesis of American labor law is a clear
canon of law that allows labor to exercise its First Amendment
rights. 213 Without freedom to exercise speech rights, the success
and viability of the nation's labor policy would be in peril.214 How
ever, the evolution of American labor law has seen this seemingly
concrete doctrine reduced to a state of amorphousness. It is un
clear how to determine what types of labor speech are now pro
tected under the scrutinizing eye of the NLRA and the U.S.
Constitution. 215
However, outside of the labor arena, the Supreme Court has
recognized and defined an array of symbols protected as extensions
of speech that are expressly covered by the First Amendment. 216 In
Spence v. Washington, the Court created a two-element test to de
termine what types of symbolic behavior come within the purview
of First Amendment protection. 217 In Spence, the Court regarded
the context in which a symbol is used to be the dispositive factor in
determining whether the symbol warrants a heightened level of ex
213. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) ("In the circumstances of
our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must
be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the
Constitution.").
214.
215.

Id.
Compare id. at 105 (holding that peaceful picketing is a constitutionally pro
tected right), with Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) (holding that picketing

does not receive same First Amendment treatment and stating, "[w]e emphatically re
ject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the
same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as pa
trolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford
to those who communicate ideas by pure speech."), and NAACP v. Claiborne Hard
ware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982) (opining that, under the Act, labor picketing is dis
tinctively different than economic or protest picketing outside the Act).
216. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557,568 (1995) (holding that the motive of a parade was expression); R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) (holding that there are times when burning a cross
is a constitutionally protected form of speech absent spoken or written words); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989) (holding that flag burning is a constitutionally
protected form of speech absent spoken or written words); Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 414-15 (1974) (holding that attaching a peace sign to a flag was a valid form of
speech to protest the United States war policy in Southeast Asia); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,505-06 (1969) (holding that the wearing of black
armbands to protest Vietnam hostilities was a valid extension and expression of
speech).
217. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
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pression. 21S In its analysis of whether a student's attaching a peace
symbol onto an American flag was speech, the Court looked at two
elements: First, it asked whether there "was an intent to convey a
particularized message."219 Second, it considered whether, "in the
surrounding circumstances[,] the likelihood was great that the mes
sage would be understood by those who viewed it."220 The Court
interpreted the peace symbol pasted on the flag not as "an act of
mindless nihilism," but rather as "a pointed expression of anguish
by the appellant about the then-current domestic and foreign affairs
of his government. "221
Once the symbolism is deemed to be an extension of speech,
courts will assess its constitutionality via an analysis articulated by
United States v. O'Brien.222 Under O'Brien, the government must
first prove that the regulation "furthers an important or substantial
government interest."223 Second, "the government interest [must
be] unrelated to the suppression of free expression. "224 Lastly, "the
incidental restriction on the alleged First Amendment freedoms
[must be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest."225
Imbedded within the O'Brien test is a distinguishing mecha
nism that determines whether a law is content based or content
neutral.2 26 When this mechanism is triggered, it initiates a "switch
ing function" from O'Brien's less stringent intermediate scrutiny to
a considerably more stringent strict scrutiny review. 227 To be re
218. [d. at 410.
219. [d. at 410-11. The particularized element of the quotient seems to have been
eliminated by the Court. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 ("[A] narrow, succinctly articul
able message is not a condition of constitutional protection ....").
220. Spence, 418 U.S. at 411.
221. [d. at 410.
222. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376-77 (1968). A critical factor in the
application of the O'Brien test is the determination of whether the reason for regula
tion is based on the content of the message or is content neutral. [d. As will be seen,
however, subsequent applications of O'Brien flesh out whether or not the motivation to
regulate or ban the symbolic behavior is content based. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397,403-06 (1989) (discussing the standard pertaining to whether the regulation is re
lated to the expression).
223. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
224. [d. (emphasis added).
225. [d.; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797 (1989) (holding
that while a content-neutral law must be closely tailored to meet its desired ends, the
government need not employ the least restrictive alternative).
226. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
227. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
519-20 (2d ed. 2002). Under strict scrutiny review "a law will be upheld if it is necessary
to achieve a compelling government purpose." [d. (emphasis added). To achieve this
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garded as content neutral (thus receiving the less stringent O'Brien
analysis) the governmental interest or purpose of the regulation
must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression."228 In
situations in which the purpose, motive, or interest of the govern
ment is related to the suppression of the symbolic speech, strict
scrutiny analysis is applied and the speech falls into a more strin
gently protected category.229
This was specifically the issue in Texas v. Johnson, in which the
defendant was convicted of burning an American flag as a symbol
of protest against the government.230 The Court found that the
Texas statute prohibiting the desecration of the flag (while content
neutral on its face) was applied solely in regard to the expressive
content of Johnson's message of dissatisfaction with the govern
ment. 231 As a result, the Court applied strict review to the statute
and found that the discriminatory application was specific to the
content of Johnson's message and, thus, unconstitutional.232 Justice
Brennan stated that, "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable."233 This concept remains constant re
gardless of "the particular mode in which one chooses to express an
idea."234
Not only is the government conduct subject to a stricter review
when attempting to prohibit symbolic speech secondary to its offen
sive nature, but it is also subject to such review when attempting to
end the government must prove that the application of the law is the least restrictive
and the least discriminatory means available; if not, the government has not satisfied its
very high burden, thus the law will be invalidated as unconstitutional. Id.
228. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
229. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989); see also James M. McGold
rick, Jr., United States v. O'Brien Revisited: Of Burning Things, Waving Things, and G
Strings, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 903, 929-30 (2006).
230. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397.
231. [d. at 411-12 (stating that the Texas statute would have allowed Johnson to
have burned the flag as a means of disposal, but not as a means of political protest).
232. [d. at 420.
233. [d. at 414 (citing, among others, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46, 55-56 (1988); City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 462-63 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978); Young v.
Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63-65, 67-68 (1976) (plurality opinion); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976) (per curiam); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
95 (1972); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382; Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142-43 (1966);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1931».
234. [d. at 416.
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restrict speech because of the communicative impact on the lis
tener. 235 In Boos v. Barry, Justice O'Connor stated that
"[l]isteners' reactions to speech are not the type of 'secondary ef
fects' we referred to in Renton . . " [This] hypothetical regulation
targets the direct impact of a particular category of speech, not a
secondary feature that happens to be associated with that type of
speech. "236
The Court has long held that symbolic expression is shielded
under the protective blanket of the First Amendment. It is worth
reiterating some of the symbols the Court has protected secondary
to content-based restrictions: burning crosses, parades, commercial
picketing protesting civil rights violations, abortion clinic picketing,
black arm bands, jackets labeled "Fuck the Draft," and of course
burning a flag. 237 While symbolic speech receives a less exacting
analysis, the O'Brien test provides for a more scrutinizing review
should it be found that the application and purpose of the restric
tion were motivated secondary to the content of the expression. 238
Moreover, should it be discovered that the speech is suppressed
235. Restrictions based on the emotive or communicative impact on the listener
are typically interpreted as content-based prohibitions and, thus, subject to strict scru
tiny review. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) (holding
that a content ban on symbols that invoked racial animosity was unconstitutional); For
syth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1992) (disallowing permits
to be regulated because of audience reaction); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,
318 (1990); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that the "Fuck the
Draft" jacket was speech designed purely for emotive impact); see also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 227, at 1029 (stating that free speech analysis "often turns on whether the
government's purpose is to suppress a particular message").
236. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,321 (1988) (discussing Renton v. Playtime Thea
tres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), and striking down a viewpoint-restrictive law which stated,
"It shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted
to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign government").
237. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557, 568 (1995); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994)
(upholding abortion clinic protests as constitutional); R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 395-96 (hold
ing that there are times when burning a cross is a constitutionally protected form of
speech absent spoken or written words); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420 (holding that flag
burning is a constitutionally protected form of speech absent spoken or written words);
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (holding a picket and
boycott of a diner secondary to perceived civil rights violations was constitutionally
protected); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414-15 (1974) (holding that attaching a
peace sign to a flag was a valid form of speech to protest the U.S. war policy in South
east Asia); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 504-06 (1969) (holding that the wearing of black arm bands to protest Viet
nam hostilities was a valid extension and expression of speech).
238. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403.
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specifically because of its emotive and communicative effects on the
listener, the test is also strict scrutiny.239
B.

Rats Can Speak-At Least Under the First Amendment

Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
an inflatable rubber rat is a protected medium of symbolic speech
under the First Amendment. 24o In Tucker, the union utilized the rat
balloon to bring attention to the unfair labor practices of a car deal
ership in Ohio.241 A content-neutral city ordinance prohibited the
use of the rat and the police ordered the union to desist from fur
ther displays.242 The Sixth Circuit stated that the government may
employ "content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations only if
they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government inter
est. "243 In essence, such a regulatory doctrine is equivalent to the
O'Brien test and the courts have used the two interchangeably pur
suant to symbolic expression. 244
The court stated, with regard to the status of the display as
speech, "In our view, there is no question that the use of a rat bal
loon to publicize a labor protest is constitutionally protected ex
pression within the parameters of the First Amendment, especially
given the symbol's close nexus to the Union's message."245 The
court agreed with the lower court's ruling that the ordinance was
not narrowly tailored to meet the interests of the state. 246
In sum, it is clear that symbols, absent words or oral speech,
receive First Amendment protection. The stringency of that protec
tion depends on the motive or purpose of the regulation. To label
such communication as conduct (for example, a rat balloon), would
fall outside the jurisprudence of established constitutional law and
abridge a right secured by the Constitution.
239. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 394; Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 134-35; John
son, 491 U.S. at 412; Boos, 485 U.S. at 321; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
240. Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 2005).
241. /d. The labor dispute in Tucker was an "area standards" dispute on a pri
mary employer. The union used the inflatable rat in conjunction with legal picketing to
bring attention to the cause. Id.
242. /d. at 460-61.
243. /d. at 463 (quoting Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 2001».
244. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407 (articulating the limited distinction be
tween the O'Brien standard and the time, place, and manner standard).
245. Tucker, 398 F.3d at 462; see also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150
v. Viii. of Orlando Park, 139 F. Supp. 2d 950, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding an inflatable
rat to be protected symbolic expression).
246. Tucker, 398 F.3d at 463-64.
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III.

THE DISPLAY OF THE RAT BALLOON PASSES
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY MUSTER

A.

The Display of the Rat Is a Form of Politically Relevant
Symbolic Speech that Should Receive Strict
Constitutional Review

Because conduct and speech receive disparate constitutional
protection, the protection of the display of the rat depends on its
categorization. Applying the Spence test to the display, it is clear
that the rat display falls into protected symbolic speech. First, the
union must prove that it is intending to communicate a message. 247
It would be extremely difficult to argue that the inflation of a
twenty-foot rat is not trying to convey a message. Further, union
organizers have stated that the rat is intended to alert the public of
a labor dispute. 248 Finally, as the Tucker court held, the rat is a
"symbol of efforts to protest unfair labor practices. "249
The second prong of Spence asks whether, "in the surrounding
circumstances[,] the likelihood [is] great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it."250 Given the universal mes
sage of the rat, it seems apparent that people entering a business
would understand the union's intended message of discontent.251
While the general public might not understand the intricacies of the
expression, the appearance of a large inflatable rat with union
members standing next to it surely articulates a dispute that, in
turn, is subjected to First Amendment protection as symbolic ex
pression. 252 This holds true so long as the union clearly articulates
247. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557,567-70 (1995); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,409-11 (1974).
248. See Feuer, supra note 4, at Bl; see also Marquez, supra note 4 ("[T]he rat
gets people to stop and ask questions about what's going on. . . . That's why we use
it. ").

249. Tucker, 398 F.3d at 460; see also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150,
139 F. Supp. 2d at 958 (holding that an inflatable rat is protected symbolic expression).
250. Spence, 418 U.S. at 411.
251. This is especially true given that, in both cases involving the rat display, the
union members also conjunctively handbilled. Handbilling provides a more detailed
explanation to the public concerning the specifics of an obvious labor dispute. Sheet
Metal Workers In!'1 Ass'n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal/), 346 N.L.R.B. 199, 200 (2006), en
forcement denied and remanded, 491 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Laborers' E. Region
Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1252 (2006).
252. Tucker, 398 F.3d at 462 ("In our view, there is no question that the use of the
rat balloon to publicize a labor protest is constitutionally protected expression within
the parameters of the First Amendment ...."); see also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
Local ISO, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 958 ("We easily conclude that a large inflatable rat is
protected, symbolic speech.").
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that the dispute is with the primary employer, which is being em
ployed by the secondary employer.
Once the Spence criteria are satisfied, the O'Brien test must be

applied. 2s3 As mentioned previously,254 the government must first
demonstrate a substantial interest in regulating the behavior. 255 As
the legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin Amendments show,
the purpose of § 158(4)(b)(ii)(B) is to prevent secondary employers
from being economically affected by disputes they did not directly
initiate. 256 Again, putting aside the obvious non sequitur that a sec
ondary employer is not responsible for the companies it hires, the
government would be able to assert a substantial government inter
est. Second, "the governmental interest [must be] unrelated to the
suppression of free expression."257 If, however, the regulation is
found to be related to suppression, then strict scrutiny review is
applied. 258
Should the government try to prohibit the rat display, it would
be difficult to prove that the suppression of the speech is not con
tent related. First, it is the rat's message that makes it offensive to
the secondary employer. It is quite obvious that unions use the rat
to communicate to the public at large that the secondary employer
is engaged in hiring practices with which the union disagrees. Busi
nesses often employ the use of props, banners, blimps, and balloons
to attract customers to patronize a particular establishment. Unless
all these promotional props are proscribed, there can be no reason
for disparately treating the rat display other than because of the
message it conveys.
Second, the government could try to assert a non-content rea
son for suppression. For example, the government could assert that
the display presents a safety hazard to motorists because it distracts
253. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). A critical factor in the
application of the O'Brien test is the determination of whether the regulatory mecha
nism is based on the content of the message or is content neutral. Id. As will be seen,
however, subsequent applications of O'Brien flesh out whether or not the motivation to
regulate or ban the symbolic behavior is content based.
254. See supra Part II.A.
255. Id. at 377.
256. Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1007-08 ("The section embodies 'the dual con
gressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to
bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending
employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own.'" (quoting NLRB
v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 341 U.S. 675, 692
(1951))).
257. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).
258. See id. at 376-77.
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their attention from traffic. Once again, however, to assume that
only an inflatable rat poses such a risk flies in the face of conven
tional wisdom and would most certainly be struck down as censor
ship.259 Third, while § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) appears content neutral in
its restriction of behavior that "threaten[s], coerce[ s], or re
strain[s]," its discriminatory application would trigger the court to
employ strict scrutiny.260
Pursuant to the foregoing analysis, one is strained to find a rea
son-other than the emotive content of the message-for prohibit
ing the use of the rat display.261 This being the case, it is
appropriate to reiterate the Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V. v.
City of St. Paul, in which the Court held that a content ban on sym
bols that invoked racial animosity was unconstitutional.262 Surely,
if the Court is going to protect the First Amendment rights of a
burning cross, a rat balloon should enjoy the same protection.
This type of analytical syllogism regarding the rat display is
also analogous to Texas v. Johnson and the act of flag burning as
speech.263 Similarly to Johnson, suppression of the symbolic speech
in the present situation would be done under the guise of the con
tent-neutral statute (i.e., the NLRA). In Johnson, the Court found
that the government's interest in prohibiting flag burning was not
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the First Amendment rights of
the speaker.264 The Court held "that the government may not pro
hibit expression simply because it disagrees with its message"265
259. The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Erznoznik v. City ofJack
sonville. In Erznoznik, the suppressed speech was the content of sexually explicit mov
ies airing at a drive-in theater. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206
(1975). The Court discounted the government's public safety argument that a giant
movie screen portraying naked bodies would cause car accidents. [d. at 215. Finding
the regulation to be censorship, the Court held that "when the government, acting as a
censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the
ground that that they are more offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly
limits its power." [d. at 209.
260. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406, 412 (1989); see also United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990).
261. Even if opponents of the display asserted that the rat balloon produced un
warranted economic hardship upon the secondary employer, the impetus for such hard
ship (assuming such a hardship actually exists) was created strictly because of the
content of the message. As a result, courts must still apply strict scrutiny review.
262. R.A.Y. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992).
263. See generally Johnson, 491 U.S. at 416 (holding that the burning of the flag
was an emotive form of political speech). The same could certainly be said of a giant
rat.
264. [d. at 418.
265. [d. at 417.
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and, furthermore, that such ability or inability to prohibit "is not
dependent on the particular mode in which one chooses to express
an idea."266 Holding that burning a flag is a form of political pro
test, the Court stated further that "[t]o conclude that the govern
ment may permit designated symbols to be used to communicate
only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no
discernable or defensible boundaries."267
The rat display is analogous to burning a flag. First, it is the
disagreeable and offensive message that the previous General
Counsel of the NLRB found to violate the Act.268 Second, absent
complete economic ruin on the part of the secondary employer, the
Government will be hard pressed to articulate some other compel
ling interest. If the Supreme Court cannot find a compelling gov
ernment interest in protecting our national symbol or in the
prohibition of a burning cross, one would suspect, based on prece
dent, that it would not find one to suppress a rat balloon. 269
In sum, it is the unequivocal contention of this Note that the
display of the rat is a protected form of symbolic political speech,
subject to regulation only if the government can show a compelling
state interest and no other less restrictive means of regulation. 270
Much like the burning of a flag is political speech, so too is the
articulation of a labor dispute.271
266.
267.
268.

Id.
Id.
Compare Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Coun
sel Div. of Advice, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., to Dorothy L. Moore-Duncan, Reg'l Dir.

Region 4, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. (May 3, 2006), http://www.nlrb.gov/sharedjiles/
Advice%20Memos/2006/4-CC-2447%2805-03-06%29.pdf (advising the allowance of the
presence of the rat because "[pJersons entering the jobsite did not pass the display"),
with Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel Div. of Ad
vice, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., to Robert H. Miller, Reg'l Dir. Region 20, Nat'l Labor
Relations Bd. (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Advice%20Memos/
2004/20-CC-3423%2812-30-04%29.pdf (advising filing a § 158(b)(4)(ii) complaint be
cause the rat was seen by entering visitors, thus constituting "confrontational conduct").
While the distinction might appear slight, it articulates an implicit legal philosophy (on
behalf of the General Counsel and the Board) concerning the display; it is not the rat
that violates the Act, but the communicative and emotive impact of it.
269. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418-19.
270. This section is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of O'Brien nor a
comprehensive application of strict scrutiny to the display for that matter. Rather, it is
intended to place the display of the rat in its rightful protective constitutional cate
gory-speech-rather than conduct.
271. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council (Debartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988) ("The handbills involved here, how
ever, do not appear to be typical commercial speech . .. for they pressed the benefits of
unionism to the community and the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy and
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Therefore, before passing judgment on the display, the Board
and the courts should understand the constitutional issues that arise
secondary to suppressing the speech. As Professor Kohler in
sightfully points out, state economic regulation is not applicable
when the goal of a boycott is "'to bring about political, social and
economic change' for themselves."272 Consequently, given the po
litical nature of the speech, the display of the rat balloon should
receive the highest form of constitutional protection. Thus, prohibi
tion of its use should be subjected to strict-scrutiny analysis. 273
B.

Pursuant to § 158(b)(4)(i), the Display of the Rat Does Not
Induce Employees of the Secondary Employer to Stop
Working by Sending a Covert Signal of a Picket Line

The display of the rat to articulate a labor dispute is not a sig
nal to other union members to either cease working, or not to cross
an imaginary picket line. 274 Rather, the display is used solely as a
means of bringing attention to a labor dispute. One union orga
nizer stated, "[T]he rat gets people to stop and ask questions about
what's going on ... that's why we use it."275 Additionally, the dis
play alerts the secondary employer to the labor dispute and allows
it to choose whether or not to continue its business with the primary
employer, which mayor may not produce adverse economic conse
the standard of living of the populace." (emphasis added)); see also NAACP v. Clai
borne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) ("While States have broad power to
regulate economic activity we do not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful politi
cal activity .... This Court has recognized that expression on public issues 'has always
rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.''' (quoting Ca
rey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))). This point is only exacerbated by the fact that
working Americans continue to lose economic ground while corporate CEOs enjoy re
cord salary increases. In 2007, the average CEO made 364 times more than the average
worker. See SARAH ANDERSON ET AL., EXECUTIVE EXCESS 2007: THE STAGGERING
SOCIAL COST OF U.S. BUSINESS LEADERSHIP 5 (2007), available at http://www.fair
economy.orglfileslExecutiveExcess2007.pdf; see also Greenhouse & Leonhardt, supra
note 16.
272. Kohler, supra note 58, at 169 (quoting Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at
911).
273. This Note recognizes that there are other potential constitutional arguments
that can be made that are pertinent to the display; namely that, on most occasions, the
rat is placed on a public sidewalk which could couple the present argument with the
sidewalk having a special position in terms of First Amendment protection. Hague v.
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
274. The inflatable rat is analogous to the hand-held banners in Overstreet, which
were held not to be signals to other union member that a picket line was present. Over
street v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d
1199, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2005).
275. Marquez, supra note 4.
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quences. As a result, any economic impact that results from the
presence of the rat is due to choices made by the secondary
employer.
While it is conceivable that the iconography of the rat could
arguably be a "signal" to employees of the neutral employer; this
cannot be the dispositive factor of the analysis given the duality of
the rat's symbolism. 276 This is especially true given that the Sixth
Circuit recently held that the display of a rat is a universally ac
cepted symbol of a labor dispute. 277 Moreover, the Overstreet court
articulated that "[t]o broaden the definition of 'signal picketing' to
include 'signals' to any passerby would turn [this] specialized con
cept ... into a category synonymous with any . .. labor dispute. . ..
[If the definition was broadened] the hand billing in DeBartolo II
would have been deemed signal picketing."278 In other words, the
doctrine of "signal" picketing rests on a very narrow constitutional
hinge. It is applicable only in situations in which it is absolutely
clear that the union is purposefully sending a covert message to
other union members to cease doing business with the secondary
employer. 279 The fact that a union member could see, and maybe
react to the display is not dispositive in warranting suppression. 280
Such is clearly the case in this instance. The rat display is not
sending a covert message to union members. First, the rat is not
being used in conjunction with a strike; it is being used to dissemi
nate information of a labor dispute to the general public, not other
union members working with the secondary employer. 281 Much
like the banners in Overstreet, the rat is traditionally placed on pub
lic property to heighten exposure to the general public and make its
message all that more effective. 282
Second, proscribed "signal picketing" is traditionally found in
situations in which the unions had a specific reason to communicate
276. While a rat is a symbol of a nonunion worker which takes the place of a
union worker during a strike, it is also a "contemptible person." See MERRIAM-WEB·
STER, supra note 121, at 1031; see also supra note 177 and accompanying text (explain
ing that constitutional principles forbid censoring speech based on who might hear it).
277. Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2005) ("The rat has
long been used as a symbol of efforts to protest unfair labor practices.").
278. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1215.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1215-16.
281. The entire concept of signal picketing thus depends on union employees
talking to each other, which is backed up by potential sanctions. See NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
282. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1216.
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to other union members that a strike line was present. 283 In this
situation there is no strike. The display is aimed at educating the
populace that there is a labor dispute present. Moreover, the dis
play brings attention to the secondary employer's complicit rela
tionship with that dispute.
To ban a speaker's right to inform the public of a labor dispute,
which is inherently political in nature, because other union mem
bers might interpret the speech as a "signal," would most certainly
violate the holding in DeBartolo II.284 This is because the disposi
tive factor in the analysis is not that the display is some covert,
iconic message or secret wink-like nod that only other union mem
bers would understand. Rather, the rat is a universally accepted
message of a labor dispute and is symbolic of an individual with an
unscrupulous character. Either way, it is an appeal to the general
public not to patronize the neutral employer because of its com
plicit relationship with the primary business. As DeBartolo recog
nized, this type of speech suppression has potential to raise serious
constitutional issues. 285 Moreover, in both recent rat balloon cases
there was no evidence produced by the General Counsel that indi
cated that, had union members continued to do business with the
secondary employer (in spite of the "secret" message), there would
have been sanctions pursued by union authorities. 286
C.

The Display Is Not "Traditional" Picketing, Thus Not
"Coercion" Under § J58(b)(4) (ii)(B)

Establishing that the display is not signal picketing is but one
corollary in the complicated matrix of analyzing § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B),
and does not end the picketing inquiry. DeBartolo II established
that "handbilling is only persuasive, whereas picketing is coer
283. Id. at 1215 n.9 (referring to the Ninth Circuit's previous ruling in Interna
tional Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local No. 433 v. NLRB,
598 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1979»; see also Gould & Preisner, 341 U.S. 675 (articulat
ing the concept of signal picketing in the context of a strike).
284. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1215 (holding that banners were not signals to union
members, but a signal to the public, similar to the signal the union sent to the public in
DeBartolo 1/).
285. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun
cil (DeBartolo 1/), 485 U.S. 568, 577-78 (1988).
286. See generally Laborers' E. Region Org. Fund, 346 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1264-65
(2006); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal I), 346 N.L.R.B. 199,
205-07 (2006), enforcement denied and remanded, 491 F.3d 429 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In
both cases the General Counsel and the AU decisions proffered the legal theory and
circumstantial evidence of signal picketing, but never any direct evidence.
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cive."287 Therefore, if the display is interpreted to represent a
picket line then the behavior would be deemed per se "coercive"
pursuant to § 158(b)(4)(ii), in that customers would be coerced not
to patronize the secondary.288
As previously mentioned, the Board and the Eleventh Circuit
have broadly defined picketing,289 while Member Liebman and the
Ninth Circuit have followed the paradigm articulated in DeBartolo
II.z90 The distinguishing feature in the first interpretation is that it
only requires the mere presence of union members at an entrance
of a secondary business to label the activity picketing and, thus,
trigger the coercion trap door of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).291
Such an arbitrary and amorphous definition is contrary to the
holding in DeBartolo II and subjects § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) to constitu
tional questions arising under the First Amendment,292 In other
words, to proscribe the rat secondary to its mere presence and the
emotive impact of its message would fly in the face of First Amend
ment jurisprudence. 293 As the Court stated in Cohen v. California,
"'words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cogni
tive force'" and that emotive appeal in no way reduces the
speaker's First Amendment rights. 294 Having established the dis
playas protected speech only further solidifies this point.

287. See Fisk, supra note 84, at 87.
288. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB (Sheet Metal II), 491
F.3d 429, 438 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
289. Id. at 437-38.
290. See supra Part I.D.
291. Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'! Ass'n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1265
(11th Cir. 2005) ("[The] important feature of picketing appears to be posting by a labor
organization ... of individuals at the approach to a place of business to accomplish a
purpose which advances the cause of the union, such as keeping employees away from
work or keeping customers away from the employer's business." (quoting Lumber &
Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2797 (Stoltze Land & Lumber Co.), 156 N.L.R.B.
388, 394 (1965))).
292. See Fisk, supra note 84, at 87-89; Kohler, supra note 58, at 177-78. It is worth
noting that both Professors Fisk and Kohler opine that DeBartolo II didn't go far
enough in the protection of First Amendment rights within the labor context, and both
also attempt to illustrate the lessened First Amendment protection of labor speech by
the Court. See Fisk, supra note 84, at 87-89; Kohler, supra note 58, at 177-78.
293. Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No.
1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1212 (9th Cir. 2005); see Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 438-39.
294. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1212 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971)); see also Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 438-39.
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A Rat Is Not a Picket Line

The display of the inflatable rat is most analogous to recent
bannering cases. The purpose of the banners, much like the rat dis
play, was to raise public attention of a labor dispute. 295 In Over
street, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the holding of DeBartolo II by
emphasizing that the "only activity that appears clearly proscribed
by the statute is 'ambulatory picketing' of secondary businesses."296
Moreover, Overstreet, like DeBartolo II, relied heavily on Senator
Kennedy's post-conference committee explanation of the statutory
language, which allows unions to carry out "all publicity short of
having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site."297 In light
of the legislative history of § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), the court held that
the activity "'falls short of revealing a clear intent' that bannering
... is always prohibited."298
Much like a hand-held banner, the display of the rat balloon is
stationary. With the exception of union members handing out in
formational handbills in front of the display, there is neither patrol
nor any confrontation with customers entering the business, other
than that initiated by customers accepting the handbills. Oppo
nents to the display will inevitably assert that the posting of the
display and union members is unto itself picketing and, thus, coer
cive under the Act. 299 Assuming arguendo that the mere presence
of union members and a rat balloon could rise to the level of a
picket line, this assertion intentionally and fatally analyzes the issue
in "a vacuum," and it ignores the serious First Amendment implica
295. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1201-02; Kohn v. Sw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters,
289 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see Benson v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners of Am. Locals 184 & 1498, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (D. Utah 2004); Mackson
Landsberg, supra note 14, at 1154.
296. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1212 (quoting DeBartolo 1I, 485 U.S. at 587).
297. [d. (quoting 105 CONGo REc. 17,898-99 (1959)); see also supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
298. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1213 (stating that, in the event an activity raises con
stitutional issues, there should be a "clear intent" by Congress to ban such activity
(quoting DeBartolo 1I, 485 U.S. at 588)).
299. See United Mine Workers of Am. Dist. 2 (Jeddo Coal Co.), 334 N.L.R.B. 677
(2001) (holding that stationary union members holding picket signs constituted a picket
line in the absence of patrolling or blocking entrance); Laborers Int'l Union of N. Am.
(Calcon Constr. Co.), 287 N.L.R.B. 570, 573 (1987) (holding that picket signs and plac
ards are not needed for picketing to be present). The cases in which the Board has
creatively found picketing secondary to "presence" have involved situations where
"traditional" picketing was used in conjunction with the presence. There was no at
tempt to disseminate information to the public and no First Amendment analysis.
Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1214 n.18. But see Sheet MetallI, 491 F.3d at 436-37 (holding
that a mock funeral procession was not a picket line).
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tions.30o This type of analysis would be a complete abandonment of
the legislative history of the Act and would put it at odds with the
Supreme Court's tight-wire constitutional analysis in DeBartolo
II.301

2.

Come On, Who's Afraid of a Balloon Anyway?

Dispelling the attenuated picketing argument does not end the
inquiry into the legality of a rat balloon.302 Should the display be
interpreted to be a "coercive" boycott call to customers-though
not a picket line-it would still be illegal under
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).303 Opponents will claim that the mere presence
of a twenty-foot inflatable rat in front of a business is a coercive
activity that would create a significant economic hardship on the
secondary employer, which would force it to cease doing business
with the primary employer.304
This argument is most aptly and ironically stated in NAACP v.
Claiborne when the Court incongruously opined that "[s]econdary
boycotts and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited, as part
of 'Congress' striking a delicate balance between union freedom of
expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees and cus
tomers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial
stri!e."'305 Opponents will certainly make the case, that while the
display of the rat is speech, its protection is limited, secondary to
the words of Congress and the Court's delineation between protest
and labor speech. 306
300. See Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 436-37; Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1214.
301. When an activity raises serious constitutional issues, the Court will assume
that the activity is legal unless there is a clear intent from Congress to proscribe such
activity. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 575.
302. Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 438-39. Once the D.C. Circuit dispelled the asser
tion that the mock funeral was picketing, it still needed to analyze whether the speech
was so coercive as to trigger a § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) violation. Id.
303. 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2000).
304. The Regional Director of the NLRB applied this type of coerciveness argu
ment to the hand-held banners in Overstreet. The argument was disposed with because
of the obvious First Amendment implications. Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1214.
305. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,912 (1982) (emphasis ad
ded) (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 617-18
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part)). The irony is that Claiborne held that picket
ing to protest Civil Rights violations was clearly a right guaranteed by the First Amend
ment even if it produced a tortious interference with business. Eugene Volokh, Speech
as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering
Utterances" and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1290 (2005).
306. A similar argument was raised by the NLRB in the Sheet Metal II. The
Board creatively asserted that Claiborne, while upholding secondary picketing, and
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This argument misses the mark on two main points: First,
when defining "coercion" in contexts such as these, it "must be un
derstood in a manner consistent with the First Amendment. "307 As
stated previously,308 the D.C. Circuit recently held that a mock fu
neral in front of a hospital (the secondary employer) to articulate a
labor dispute did not rise to the level of being so coercive as to
proscribe the speech. 309 The court analogized the union's labor
protest to the abortion protest cases in which the Supreme Court
held that proscribing the protests (despite the use of offensive lan
guage and bullhorns) would jeopardize the protester's First
Amendment rights. 310 Given recent rebukes by two different cir
cuits to the Board's legal reasoning concerning bannering and street
theater, one would be hard pressed to assert that the presence of a
rat balloon would rise to the level of coerciveness-at least under
the analyses of the Ninth and D.C. Circuits. 311 In short, the D.C.
Circuit correctly holds that, in order to suppress labor speech as
being coercive, coerciveness must be defined within the parameters
of First Amendment jurisprudence. 312
The second problem with analogizing to Claiborne-as the
Board did in Sheet Metal I-is that the Court never answers the
question of how to define coercion and goes on to state:
While States have broad power to regulate economic activity, we
do not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful political activ
ity such as that found in the boycott in this case. This Court has
recognized that expression on public issues "has always rested on
the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values. "313

In the scenario being examined in this Note, a union is waging
an informational campaign that appeals to customers to boycott the
secondary employer based on the persuasiveness of its message
boycotts in the civil rights arena, prohibited the practice in the labor context. See Sheet
Metal II, 491 F.3d at 436-37.
307. [d. at 439.
308. See supra Part I.D.2.
309. Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 439 (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716
(2000)); see Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 758 (1994).
310. See Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 439 (citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 716); see Madsen,
512 U.S. at 758.
311. See Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 439; Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters
& Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1219 (9th Cir. 2005).
312. Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 439.
313. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (emphasis ad
ded) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
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(that a labor dispute is present).314 The message being dissemi
nated is quite political in nature. It raises serious social issues and
allows for a purely democratic response. There are no physical bar
riers, no blocked doorways-just the force of an idea. While the
economic effects of the speech may be substantial, it is the result of
the persuasiveness of an idea, not some coercive barrier erected by
the union. 315 The symbol of the rat supplements and accentuates
the idea, giving it life, and producing the visceral response all great
writers and orators hope to evoke from audiences to their work.
The reaction to the speech is, therefore, a conscious choice for the
hearer. If the customers do not want to accept the message as they
patronize the secondary business, they can just look away.316
Within this apparent tension lies the rub. As Professor Kohler
pointed out, this is why the constitutional avoidance doctrine articu
lated in Catholic Bishop was used in DeBartolo II.317 Rather than
affirmatively settle the issue and admit the incongruence between
the less protected labor speech versus other political speech (thUS
effectively challenging the legitimacy of the Act), the DeBartolo II
Court chose the doctrinal path of least resistance. 318
In sum, whether it is time for the Court to finally address this
issue head on or once again choose to interpret the statute as not
prohibiting the display is obviously for the Court to decide. How
ever, the display of the rat balloon is legal from a statutory as well
as a constitutional perspective. Much like handbilling and banner
ing, it relies on the persuasiveness of its idea, not the coerciveness
of the conduct. 319 The displays alone-like banners-are stationary
and are representative of the ideas of the union. The emotive im
pact of those ideas has already been proven not to be a dispositive
314. See supra Introduction.
315. See generally Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 439-40 (holding that the ambulatory
patrol of labor protesters did not create a symbolic barrier); Rakoczy, supra note 173, at
1649-50 (positing that picketing should be judged using a coercive standard, rather than
the current archaic standard).
316. Erzoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975); Cohen v. Califor
nia, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1214-20.
317. Kohler, supra note 58, at 170 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1988)). It is
important to note that recent decisions by the Ninth and D.C. Circuits have also fol
lowed the logic of Catholic Bishop to avoid serious constitutional questions in the realm
of labor speech. See Sheet Metal II, 491 F.3d at 437, 439; Overstreet, 409 F. 3d at 1209
20.
318. Kohler, supra note 58, at 170 (citing DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 575-76).
319. See supra Part I.E.l (discussing DeBartolo II); see also Sheet Metal II, 491
F.3d at 437-39; Overstreet, 409 F.3d 1214.
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factor in the suppression of First Amendment rights. 320 Suppres
sion of those rights would raise serious constitutional issues. 321
D.

Proscribing the Display of the Rat Would Be Contrary to the
Purposes and Policy Behind the Inception of the NLRA

The impetus of the NLRA was to provide industrial peace and
bring a semblance of equality to the American workforce. 322 This
was achieved by legalizing organized representation and collective
bargaining for the outgunned workers. 323 "[T]he growth of indus
trial empires" has rendered "the bargaining power of the individual
worker ... illusory." Thus, Congress found it is necessary to level
the playing field. 324 As Professor Modjeska pointed out, "The use
of economic weapons, force and pressure are essential ingredients
of the free collective bargaining process recognized by our society
and its labor policy. Much blood was shed by labor and manage
ment over the establishment of the forgoing principles."325 To strip
an already outnumbered and outgunned minority of a vital eco
nomic tool because of a dormant constitutional interpretation is
reprehensible, and it only furthers a disparate divide of economic
power. 326
As previously mentioned, organized labor currently appears at
its nadir since the codification of the NLRA.327 Union membership
320. See supra Part II.A.
321. Finally, opponents of the display could argue that the speech is fraudulent
because it gives the false impression of a rodent problem or inaccurately describes the
labor dispute, and is thus not deserving of First Amendment protection. As mentioned
previously however, the symbol of the rat is universally recognized as one of a labor
dispute. Moreover, so long as the union accurately describes the party involved in the
labor dispute, the message would not be perceived as fraudulent. See supra note 186
and accompanying text.
322. See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316-17 (1965).
323. See supra Part LA.; see also Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1041.
324. Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1041. One is hard pressed not to wonder how
Professor Modjeska would respond in the present era, given the rise of globalization,
record corporate salaries and the technological impact on labor in 2006 as opposed to
the 1930s.
325. /d. at 1042. It also seems worth noting that Professor Modjeska was one of
the NLRB attorneys who argued Tree Fruits in front of the Supreme Court. Id. at 1005,
Biography.
326. See Michael C. Harper, The Consumers Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP
v. Clairborne Hardware and Its Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE LJ.
409, 421 (1984) (proposing that the right of "[a]n individual's decision to join a con
sumer boycott must be protected precisely because it enables the individual to affect
the economy, not in spite of such effects"). Harper further posits this right to be as
equally a moral right as a legal one. Id.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 2, 16.
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is at its lowest point in the history of organized labor, real wages for
the American worker are on the decline, and the current poverty
rate for the richest nation in the world is an appalling thirty-seven
million people. 328 All the while, corporate profits, salaries, and pro
ductivity rise at the expense and sweat of the American worker. 329
Is this what Congress envisioned when it enacted federal labor pol
icy in the form of the NLRA?
In 1984, Professor Modjeska posited that the fictional quality
of the primary-secondary distinction "where the ostensibly neutral
employer sells and profits from the sales of the struck product there
is again a strong feeling, if not a principle that supports the proposi
tion that the neutral is not in fact wholly uninvolved but has be
come a party pro tanto."330 To limit a union's speech based on a
fictional distinction would seriously undermine one of our nation's
long-standing labor policies of aiding the American worker in the
"socioeconomic struggle."331 This proposition is especially true
given the multi-facility of enterprises, and globalization of our cur
rent economic markets. Did Congress intend to allow "secondary"
employers to exploit the American worker by hiring businesses that
do not provide a living wage, health benefits, or do shoddy work
manship while giving the complicit, once-removed employer a
shield from economic pressure under § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B)?332
Such a policy is contrary to the spirit of the Act and should not
be allowed to continue. At a time of disparate economic power
between workers and corporations, unions should have the right to
freely voice concerns and disseminate information concerning a la
bor dispute. As Justice Murphy stated in Thornhill v. Alabama,
"[I]n the circumstances of our times the dissemination of informa
tion concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as
within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Consti
328. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY: 2006 HIGHLIGHTS, http://www.census.
gov/hhes/www/poverty/poverty06/pov06hLhtmi (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
329. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 271, at 5 (detailing the disparity between cor
porate salaries and American workers).
330. Modjeska, supra note 38, at 1047. Professor Modjeska's comments appear
significantly prophetic given the advance of globalization, free trade, and the ability for
employers to ship business to poorer counties where the labor costs are substantially
less than in the United States.
331. [d.; see Harper, supra note 326, at 420-21.
332. With the advance of globalization, the primary-secondary distinction seems
to have become a legal fiction. However, that is different argument, slated for a differ
ent day.
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tution. . . . The health of the present generation and of those yet
unborn may depend on these matters ...."333
To allow current labor law to remain ossified in the wake of
drastic and global economic inequity, only reinforces the absence of
justice and human rights within the American workforce. 334 Sur
rounded by a global economy it's easy to imagine and compare
American workers to the overmatched island state of Melos, while
the current corporate power structure assumes its position like that
of the Athenian Army,335 which consumes and exploits the dispar
ity of power between itself and workers for furtherance of its own
ends. This inequality in economic power should not mandate un
ions and workers to grant even more of an advantage to the fic
tional "neutral" business by disallowing the dissemination of
information of a labor dispute. Such a policy serves only to further
an outdated, inflexible labor Act and perpetuates the ever-ex
panding imbalance between corporations and the people who work
for them.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing principles, the prohibition of the dis
play of the rat at a secondary employer to disseminate the informa
tion of a labor dispute contravenes the purpose and history of what
the NLRA-at its roots-stands for. 336 Allowing (and aiding) the
disparity between business and labor to grow, only increases the
likelihood that the state of labor relations could eventually regress
to a point of economic instability, or at the very least significant
disruption of the commercial flow of the United States. Moreover,
there is a moral question that should guide the current labor juris
prudence and policy. As Plutarch espoused, "an imbalance be
tween rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all
republics. "337 Therefore, to take away the few economic tools the
worker has left, defeats the vision of the Act and sends society
333. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940).
334. Interrelating the concept that labor rights are inexorably connected with
human rights. Further, "[v]iolation of those rights deny a person's humanity." James
A. Gross, A Logical Extreme: Proposing Human Rights as the Foundation for Workers'
Rights in the United States, in JUSTICE ON THE JOB, supra note 20, at 21, 23; Fraser,
supra note 2, at 6-8; Harper, supra note 326, at 420-2l.
335. THUCYDIDES, supra note 1, at 294-306.
336. Block et aI., supra note 20, at 1-3.
337. Robert H. Frank, The Spread Between the Rich and the Rest Has Been Grow
ing for Decades. Current Policies Will Only Make It Worse, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 27,
2005, at COl (quoting Plutarch).
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closer to an apparition of justice where the strong do what they can
and the weak grant what they must-despite the social, political,
and moral consequences. 338
Richard J. Padykula *

338. THUCYDIDES, supra note 1, at 294-306; see also PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (R.E.
Allen trans., 2006). In The Republic, Plato marked the justice debate between Socrates
and Thrasymachus. Thrasymachus contended that justice is an amorphous social illu
sion. Since the Gods did not enforce any sense of justice in their world-justice must
then be defined as the advantage of the stronger. Id. at 21. This is why laws primarily
advance the position of those in power. Therefore, injustice is "stronger and more free
and more masterful than justice." Id. at 22. Socrates countered with a position stating
that justice (i.e., fairness and morality) is an important moral and noble social good that
is essential for the betterment of society and the laws it produces. Id. at 23. This Note
asserts that unless society recoils from the current brand of Thrasymachus-like injustice,
our moral and socioeconomic stability will be in jeopardy-similar to those dark days
prior to the Wagner Act.
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the loves of my life, my wife Nora and son Bobby. You are the stars which guide my
path and inspire my dreams.

